

The Human Perspective

BY

GARDNER WILLIAMS

The Human Perspective

Being an Interest Theory of Value

This study is based on a dissertation entitled, "The Role of Pleasure in the Theory of Value," submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan.

BY

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PREFACE

My obligations to many previous writers will be evident to anyone who reads both the following pages and the standard works on value mentioned in the foot-notes.

Professor De Witt H. Parker, Professor Roy Wood Sellars, and Professor John F. Shepard, all of the University of Michigan, have guided my studies and have suggested many of the ideas which I have here set forth.

I am indebted to the editors of the International Journal of Ethics for permission to print the last chapter.

GARDNER WILLIAMS.



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CHAPTER I.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AN INTEREST THEORY OF VALUE.

I—The Human Perspective—Axiological Ego-centrism.

It is well known that the natural universe has no center. It needs to be emphasized that the heart of man is the center of the value universe. Or, more accurately, the heart of each man is the center of his own value universe; for each personality constitutes such an axiological cosmos. The good (if any) or goods, which the heart yearns after, are not the key concept in the theory of value. The feelings in the soul or the feeling-attitudes emanating from it as a center are the prime factors in every value situation. The objects toward which attitudes may be directed are peripheral and possess a value which is only secondary. Objects cannot draw upon themselves the focus of attitudes which ignore them; and without some intent or interest aiming at them from near or far, but necessarily from without, objects external to the value experience are devoid of value. Even objects which are good merely on the score of being useful, without being the objects of any interests and thus having no value in the proper meaning of that term, like vitamins before they were discovered, are good only thru some indirect causal relation to some living interest or to its object. For ages vitamins have been a necessary part of the cause of all human achievements, since without them the race would have wasted and died. Vitamins were good before we knew them and thus before we could take any interest in them, but that goodness even then was relative to our interests which they supported. In the absence of any interest, either to support or to be the object of, a vitamin is axiologically neutral.

This ego-centric principle applies in art and in morals and thruout the value field. 'There are nine and sixty ways of constructing tribal lays, and every single one of them is right'. They are all right for those that like them. And there are still more ways of living a good life. Any way that satisfies deeply in the long run is a right way. There are as many ways as there are natures of men. All men have certain similarities, and obviously where two men desire the same type of thing, one man's kind of happiness will do for another. But no two men are exactly alike. And a good cannot be imposed on an unwilling nature ab extra without a greater or less mutilation. In its new unwonted home the good is no longer good, but evil. The philosopher who takes any object, ideal, or rule of conduct, or anything except a value experience, and calls it an intrinsic good, is committing an egregious error. An external intrinsic good is an utterly self contradictory and impossible notion. Attitudes select things external to them and make them good or bad. The crucial fact in value theory is the heart of man, i. e., his affective-volitional nature; it is his feelings and interests and desires and propensities. In values man is the measure of all things. The values of external things loom and dwindle, not as the things do in their own right and

nature, but as they seem or appear (not visually but affectively and emotionally) to him. With internal pleasant or unpleasant experiences the nature of the thing is as it appears. The value of everything is as a man feels it or regards it. In values *esse est percipi*. To be is to be realized or felt. There is nothing either good or bad but feeling makes it so. We are dealing, not with the nature of objects external to us, but with the perspective in which they appear to us who have or are the point of view which generates the vista. Human axiology is a study of the human perspective.

II—Primary vs. Secondary Value.

The term 'positive value' should be used for the value of what is good; 'negative value' should mean the value of what is evil or bad. Positive and negative value might also be called 'value' and 'disvalue' respectively. For the present however I shall use 'value' in the wider meaning to include both the positive and negative forms. Taking it so, it still has two very different senses. In the former it is simply the affective or feeling aspect of experience. In the second it is the meaning or relation of the object of an interest, to the interest. These two kinds of value are very different; and they exhaust the field of value. There are no other kinds of value except subdivisions within these two major classes. It is obvious that in the former sense value is purely subjective. I shall call this primary value. Other names for it are intrinsic value, intrinsic goodness-badness, intrinsic agreeableness-disagreeableness, intrinsic pleasantness-unpleasantness, subjective value, subjective goodness-badness, subjective agreeableness-disagreeableness, subjective pleasantness-unpleasantness, feeling, affect, positive-negative feeling-tone, hedonic tone, the feeling of satisfaction-dissatisfaction, and pleasure-unpleasure or pleasure-pain considered as a feeling. This is a mental process without special sense organs. I do not mean by it tickle, itch, thrill, ecstasy, excitement, cutaneous pain, or any sensory aspect of experience. It is an ultimate way in which configurations of experience differ. It is a quality or attribute or aspect or element of some total experience. It is the only intrinsic value there is, and it is always an intrinsic value. It may in addition have secondary or objective or relative or extrinsic value (these all mean the second great type of value). While primary value depends for its existence upon certain neurological processes, it is axiologically absolute.

It may have intent or sense or transcendent reference. Probably most and perhaps all feelings are not self contained. They point outward. They have a reference to something beyond themselves. We probably have some feeling, positive or negative, toward everything that we know about. Most or all feelings are feeling-attitudes. To express the phenomenon of a feeling with direction, significance, or 'sense', we use such phrases as 'to delight in', or 'to care for', 'to be pleased or displeased with', or 'to be satisfied or dissatisfied with', or 'to like or dislike'.

A feeling-attitude combined with some idea of the object makes what I call an interest. The object of an interest or feeling-attitude has, from the very fact of its being such an object, secondary value. The quantity of this secondary value is determined by the strength of the feeling. The more we like a thing the more value it has for us. This second type of value is what is generally meant when the word 'value' is used without qualification. It is what R. B. Perry meant

when he said that value is a function of interest. It 's what Urban meant when he said that value is the affective-volitional meaning of an object. Most writers on moral philosophy, when they have said 'value', have meant the value of some object in which some living thing was interested. Occasionally they have sensed the presence of something properly called value at the source of the interest, and have spoken of this as value, but without distinguishing this sense from the more ordinary one. They have tried to apply their concepts of secondary value to the very different thing which I call primary value. It is important to keep these things separate. The feeling at the source of the interest is, and does not have, primary value. The total experience in which the interest occurs, and also the interest itself, has primary value; that is, it includes or possesses positive or negative feeling-tone. The object of the interest has, and is not, secondary value. The meaning of the object to the interest is the secondary value. The primary value is absolute and intrinsic. The secondary value is purely relative. This secondary value, being the value of the object of an interest, may be called 'objective value'. Using the word objective here is a matter of convenience in terminology and is not to be taken to imply that the curse of subjectivism has in any sense been removed (if it is a curse). Objective value is always relative to a subjective feeling-attitude, and is wholly dependent thereon for its existence. Objective value is one form of objective goodness-badness. (The other form is utility-disutility or the service or disservice which anything is or does to any living being, without necessarily being known to that being, and thus not necessarily being the object of any interest). Objective value is synonymous with objective pleasantness-unpleasantness, or the satisfactoryness-unsatisfactoryness of objects to interests taken in them. It is the meaning, significance, or importance of the object of an interest to an interest. What the object means to a positive interest is that it will satisfy it; and what it means to a negative interest is that it will not do so. The value of an object A to an interest B then is simply 'that A will satisfy B'. 'To satisfy' here does not mean 'to produce a feeling of satisfaction'. It means 'to be the object of the intent of an intent-feeling of satisfaction', or 'to be the object of a positive intent-feeling'. A is not a means to the production of pleasure. It is the object of a pleasure with an intent, or of a 'delight in'. Secondary value may be called indifferently a relation between the object and the interest, or that tertiary quality of the object which consists in the fact that the interest is taken in it or has it for its object.

III—The Treatment of Feeling in Urban and Perry.

In contending that the secondary value of a thing depends upon the quantity or strength (either metaphor you like) of the actual feeling directed toward it, and that this feeling is a primary intrinsic value, and constitutes the axiological absolute, I come into conflict, in some degree, with the views of both R. B. Perry and W. M. Urban, which I wish now to examine. And the reason for our differences is, I venture to think, that these men use feeling in a different sense from that in which I use it. Perry says that he means organic sensation, and sticks to it. Urban is ambiguous, but in places I am convinced that this is what he is thinking of. I shall deal with Perry first.

Perry's book¹ is a synthesis of neo-realism and behaviorism. He is thus opposed to mentioning consciousness or awareness or experience. What one might be inclined to call the content of consciousness is for him just the environment,² and mental processes are neuro-muscular motions. This manner of thinking is a healthy exercise for the purpose of getting rid of ancient errors; but it seems to me that the same end can be achieved without denying the existence of experience as something which is identical neither with the neural events upon which it depends, nor with the environmental factors which stimulate and in a measure control these neural events. Perry however does not recognize consciousness, and thus ignores feeling-tone which can only exist in consciousness. If it were only a sensation he might, with some plausibility, identify it with the environmental object which constituted the stimulus. But in the case of an affect there is nothing outside which it might even seem to correspond to or be identified with. There is no special stimulus for this kind of a mental process. It is not referable to any afferent nerve endings. There is no place for it in the scheme of things as conceived after either the behavioristic or the neo-realistic manner. Neo-realism must ignore it. Behaviorism makes it identical with certain neural happenings, thus depriving it of its essential nature as a feeling.

Perry defines interest in as purely behavioristic a manner as he can. According to his view there could be no interest without a motor element (p. 305). He defines interest no differently from interested action. "Interest means—response governed by an accompanying expectation" (p. 523). "An act is interested—when it is performed because of what is expected of it" (p. 434). One of his formal definitions which gives the gist of the matter is as follows: "Interested or purposive action is action adopted because the anticipatory responses which it arouses coincide with the unfulfilled or implicit phase of a governing propensity" (p. 209).³ Here of course there is some room left for conscious processes. The adoption of the action would seem to be a conscious act; and the recognition of the coincidence of the anticipatory responses aroused by the act, with the implicit phase of the governing propensity, would seem to be more than a mere neural event, however much it may be, as it certainly is, entirely dependent upon such. Thus Perry does not wholly succeed in ignoring consciousness. He does, however, in all the deliberate formulations of his theory, succeed in ignoring the feeling aspect of it, and particularly the feeling aspect of interest. He discusses at length what he calls feeling (p. 276-305), but this turns out to be merely organic sensations. He then rightly concludes that this feeling is only remotely related to value theory (p. 304-305). Feeling in this sense can acquire value by becoming the object of any interest, as he rightly insists, and also, as he fails to recognize, by itself just being pleasant with a subjective pleasantness or a feeling-tone of its own. In either case it is something that has value, and is neither value nor something that gives or lends value. The thing

1—General Theory of Value; R. B. Perry; N. Y., 1926; Longmans Green.

2—Ibid p. 31, 315, 403.

3—For other statements about the nature of interest see p. 163 especially, and also p. 355, 359, 434, 439, 521, 523, 567, 568, 586.

that in the first case gives secondary value, and in both cases is primary value, is the feeling aspect of experience, which Perry ignores. And I contend that interest and value cannot be adequately described without mentioning it. As an intent-feeling it is an essential aspect of the experience of every interest. As a non-intent-feeling it is the primary value of every configuration of experience, or part of a configuration, which is devoid of attitude or transcendent reference (if there are such. I do not dogmatize. I think that probably there are such experiences).

Perry twice uses the word 'apathy' to signify the absence of any interest (p. 230, 568), and since this term generally means the absence of feeling he might be interpreted as meaning that an interest necessarily involved a feeling. But he must not be so interpreted in view of his very definite statements to the effect that to be interested is not to feel interested (p. 141), and that feeling is a sensation and is not the value fundamental (p. 304-305), and in view of his definitions of interest which ignore the affective aspect completely.

In short, his view of the importance of feeling differs from the view herein maintained because he is a behaviorist and I am not, and because he means by feeling organic sensation, and I do not.

Urban's view of feeling is in some respects more difficult to interpret than Perry's. Certain aspects however are fairly clear. He follows Meinong in asserting that feeling is the value fundamental.⁴ He says that kinaesthetic sensations are irrelevant (p. 38), though in a measure forgets this later on. He shows that desire always implies the existence of feeling (p. 37), and that Ehrenfels, who said that desire was the value fundamental, really falls back on feeling to account for its strength and direction (p. 36-37).⁵ But he recognizes that the feeling aspect of a feeling-attitude is not essentially different from the non-intent-feeling-tone of an attitudeless experience. True he says that there is a 'fundamental' distinction between these, but the distinction which he makes is bound up with his erroneous view that one generates value or "contains the worth moment" and the other does not. Really they both do. And he rightly regards them as made of the same stuff. "A fundamental distinction seems to exist between feeling which is a mere feeling-tone, accompaniment or effect of a sensation or revived image, and feeling-attitude which is characterized by the direction of the feeling toward the object. Feeling-attitudes alone seem to constitute the worth-moment. It is undoubtedly true that feeling-tone of presentation, when it reaches a certain degree of intensity, gives rise to a feeling-attitude, to the presentation of the cause as object and the direction of judgment toward it, and thus to feeling of worth" (p. 40). This feeling-attitude, he adds, is distinguished from feeling-tone by the presence of additional presuppositions. His notion of presuppositions, which he gets from Meinong, amounts to a recog-

4—Urban, Wilbur M., *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, p. 36, 38. Macmillan, N. Y., 1909.

5—See Ehrenfels, C. von, *System der Werttheorie*, p. 38, 65. Leipzig, 1897, O. R. Reisland. Ehrenfels, like Urban and Perry and many others, seems to me to misinterpret feeling thru not sufficiently distinguishing it from kinaesthetic sensations. See Ehrenfels, *op. cit.*, p. 15, 16, 35, 38, 39.

inition of the necessity of some idea of the object of the attitude in any value experience involving an attitude. The important thing in this quoted passage is his use of the word feeling in the same sense in both the expressions feeling-tone and feeling-attitude. The former is a feeling not directed toward anything. The latter is a feeling directed toward something. We are dealing with one thing, feeling, which can be directed and have intent, or not. The distinction which he makes, that the intent-feeling has direction, has presuppositions (an idea of its object), and generates value, whereas the non-intent-feeling does not have or do these things, is not fundamental if one is concerned with the nature of feeling. It is only important if we are interested in the question of whether or not some object external to the value experience gets value from it. And he overemphasizes the importance of this because he thinks that this is none other than the question of whether or not value is present at all. He admits no value unless there is an attitude. The only value of which he formulates a definition is secondary value. What I call primary value in an intent-less experience he denies is a value, and he denies that the experience, as such, has value. The mere feeling-tone of a presentation (he means an intent-less experience) is not, according to his view, a worth experience,⁶ and furthermore, what I call the primary value in an interest, the feeling aspect, he never speaks of as value.

In one place at least he speaks of it as having value, and he implies that the value that it has is the same that its own complementary object has. He says that some cognition of the object must occur in addition to feeling or desire in order that there should be a value for the object to have, and then adds that this process of valuation, as aided by cognition, "gives to the feeling or desire that meaning described as worth" (p. 95). And he makes no distinction between this worth and the worth of the object. But if the object gets value from its relation to feeling and desire, then the value that it has is not possessed by that or any other feeling or desire. The process of valuation does not give to the interest itself any value, using value as Urban defines it. The feeling aspect of the interest is primary value, and the only value that is conferred on anything is a secondary value which is conferred on the complementary object. But Urban, like Perry, in spite of a definition of value that covers only the secondary variety, occasionally moves it over into the subject or source, and tries to make it do the work for both varieties. Thus Urban denies that any feeling, either intent-feeling or non-intent-feeling, is value. He does not admit that primary value is a legitimate concept.

And in the passage which I quoted on page 7 from his page 40 there is another point which I wish to criticize. He says that when passive intentless feeling-tone becomes strong enough it becomes a feeling-attitude. Nothing could imply more clearly the truth that an interest is just a feeling which has been directed toward something. But still it is not true that an increase in the strength of the passive feeling turns it into an attitude. Probably an attitude-less experience may be extremely vivid and intensely pleasant. I imagine that some mystical experiences are of this order. And a

6—Valuation, Its Nature and Laws, p. 39, 40, 54, 63, 93. See also 14 Psychological Review, 1907, p. 21.

feeling-attitude may be weak. The difference between the two varieties of feeling is the difference between the case where a man ignores anything that transcends the immediate experience, and the case where he considers some of it. This is determined by a number of factors; by neural events in the central nervous system, by the clamor of stimuli at the sensory end organs, and perhaps by other things; but it is determined very little, if at all, by the strength of the feeling-tone.

I wish to emphasize, however, the truth enunciated in the quoted passage, that non-intent-feeling and intent-feeling are not essentially different sorts of things. Urban expresses this truth in other places. He justifies his use of the expression 'affective-volitional meaning' as the equivalent or definition of value (he means secondary value) by maintaining that affect and volition (feeling, and will or conation) are essentially the same thing (p. 33-34). The only difference is that will implies an attitude, and feeling does not necessarily do so. Conation and will are active feeling-attitudes. "Feeling as passive is—not to be separated from will as active" (p. 77).⁷ "The entire vital or worth series is one" (the progress from anticipatory thru present to retrospective interest in a given object) "with a continuity of affective-volitional meaning. Each phase may be interpreted as conation or feeling according to the point of view from which it is observed" (p. 92). "Feeling and desire (desire is will and conation) are—relative differences of functional meaning, not of content.—The affective-volitional meaning, or worth, of an object," is "its relation to desire and conative disposition as interpreted by feeling" (p. 95).

An attitude, then, is a feeling. But, according to Urban, not all attitudes or interests give value to their complementary objects. "Fleeting desires do not attain to the level of valuation" (p. 39).⁸ Only with some constancy of interest, he thinks, does the object get value. Here he betrays a tendency to use value in a eulogistic sense, and thus to forsake the ideal of defining value itself. He does not wish to talk about low and ephemeral values.⁹ These of course are just as much values, tho not as much value, as the greatest. He admits, what I would deny, that a feeling-attitude is possible which does not give value to its complementary object.

He also affirms that feelings may be present in a value experience which are irrelevant to the values therein determined. He mentions Brentano's doctrine of 'hedonic redundancies',¹⁰ and points out that in valuing anything we may feel some strong emotion and have a mass of organic sensations which are perhaps pleasant when the feeling toward the thing is negative. Some people enjoy the process of scolding others and would be quite at a loss what to do if there were no one to err and to be upbraided. These people are not wholly pleased with the others whom they scold, but they are pleased with the emotional thrill of it, and with themselves for being able to do it, and with the others only instrumentally, considering them favorably

7—See also 14 Psychological Review, 1907, p. 117.

8—See also Ibid, p. 20.

9—Compare what Perry says of S. Alexander in regard to the latter's limiting value to one branch only of the field. Perry op. cit. p. 120.

10—Urban, Valuation, p. 74-75, and 14 Psyc. Rev., 1907, p. 114-115.

only as a means to the ends which they desire directly. Urban rightly points out that we have here a situation in which one thing is pleasant and another is in a certain aspect unpleasant; he sees that there is no great difficulty in distinguishing one from the other. There are two or three value experiences, and not one. But by calling the pleasant organic sensations which make up the emotional thrill 'hedonic redundancies' he is implying by the word 'hedonic' that they are feelings, and thus he slips over into a use of the word feeling which can only serve to confuse a value theory. And by mentioning them at all in this connection he is implying that they somehow belong to that unpleasant experience which is the negative interest in the person who is being scolded. But this is not true. No part of the feeling which one has toward a thing is redundant or irrelevant to that value of the thing which is given to it by that attitude. Any other feeling is irrelevant, but is no part of that value experience. In the value experience which generates any given secondary value in an object there is no hedonic redundancy so long as 'hedonic' means 'affective'.

Urban also gives the wrong impression of the role of feeling in valuation when he speaks of 'intensity-less appreciation and 'affective generals'. This is the same problem as 'hedonic redundancies' only from another angle. Unless one examines his work rather carefully one might suppose that he meant that an attitude could occur in which the intensity of the feeling was zero, that is, in which there was no feeling. I do not think that he means this. But he asserts that as the value of a thing grows on one the feeling-element in the valuation process gradually drops out in a manner analogous to that in which the particular imaginal content is dropped out in the development of an abstract cognitive concept. "As the means of the concept develops,—the particular presentation becomes less and less significant, until what is practically imageless apprehension may appear. So also with the development of the selective meanings of feeling-attitude, the hedonic resonance may become less and less significant until relatively intensitiless appreciation of the worth of the object appears."¹¹ Does he mean by 'hedonic resonance' what he meant by 'hedonic redundancy'? Does he mean by it organic sensation? If so, what he says is true, but the feeling aspect of the feeling-attitude is left, and this will have some intensity, or else the object will have no worth. These organic sensations are no part of the value experience which gives worth to the object. They function in a value experience of their own, and their disappearance abolishes this experience but does not make the main value experience intensity-less in any proper meaning of that expression. If he means that the feeling aspect of the feeling-attitude can drop out and the attitude can still be an attitude and its object have value, he is wrong. Some of his discussion is suggestive of this interpretation. However I should say that his predominant view is that it is only organic sensations that drop out in the formation of the affective general. If this is so his assertion that the 'hedonic resonance' drops away is misleading, since it never was any part of the value experience which he is talking about. It functions in another one which may stand in more or less intimate relations with the first.

He has a few other sentences which bear upon this question. "If then by 'intensity' we mean not the broader Kantian conception of any modification of degree of inner experience, but that particular degree which applies to sensation and feeling-tone of sensation, there can be no question but that worth feelings, as determined by judgment and assumption, may be practically intensitiless."¹² If they are still feelings when they have no intensity I cannot avoid the conviction that he is contradicting himself. When a worth feeling, a feeling-tone, ceases to have any degree of intensity it ceases to be a feeling-tone, and no longer is or supports any value. One sentence would indicate that the 'intensity' he speaks of might cover nervous excitement or even muscular tension. "A quiet sense of obligation may reveal a degree of worth of an ideal object which the intensest passion and emotion does not suggest."¹³ True enough, but then there is a very strong or great or intense or deep (any metaphor you like) feeling present in the sense of obligation. It is not noisy. It is not responsible for any nervous excitement or muscular tension. It does not give rise to any visceral reverberation (i. e., intense passion and emotion). But its strength and intensity is proved by its control of behavior. The test of intensity is not boisterousness but control of behavior in the face of conflict with other powerful feelings. And again we find that "—the term intensity-less appreciation means that the degree of intensity of the sensitivity in which the feeling is embodied is irrelevant for the worth suggestion of the feeling" (*Valuation*, p. 129). What does he mean by sensitivity? Is a feeling ever, in any sense, embodied in sensitivity? Again the most likely interpretation is that he is referring to the organic and kinaesthetic sensations which often accompany a feeling-attitude, but which are no part of it, and in which it is not really embodied in any proper sense of the word. Note that here, as in the first quotation in this paragraph, he speaks of the feeling as being intensity-less, rather than speaking of an attitude without any feeling. If there were an attitude without any feeling then there would be something which should properly be called intensity-less appreciation. The feeling would be at zero. There would be no feeling. As long as there is a feeling it is not at zero. And this is the feeling that I am talking about, and maintaining that in a value experience it is always present and has an intensity which corresponds with the value of the object. Its strength or intensity or magnitude is the cause and the measure of the secondary value of the object.

IV—Some Further Distinctions and Definitions.

A distinction should be drawn between direct and indirect secondary value, and the interest which generates the former should be called a direct interest, while one that generates the latter should be called an indirect interest.

Direct secondary value is the value of economic consumption goods. It is what is often very inaccurately called intrinsic value. (No secondary value is ever intrinsic). A direct interest is one which is taken in an object on account of such qualities belonging to the object as would, on a common sense view, be called intrinsic to it. Direct interest is not concerned with the instrumental char-

12—14 *Psyc. Rev.*, 1907, p. 116.

13—14 *Psyc. Rev.*, 1907, p. 16.

acteristics of anything, nor with the fact that the thing may be connected with anything else in any way, as, for instance, if both were parts of one whole and always went together. A direct interest is concerned with the size, shape, smell, behavior, etc., of the object itself.

All instrumental value is indirect value. This is the value that economic production goods have. An indirect interest is one that is taken in an object on account of the object's connection (causal, part-whole, or what not) with some other object that is the object of a direct interest. If a means to an end has value qua means to that end, it is the object of an indirect interest. A man has a direct interest in the fruits of his garden if he intends to enjoy eating them, and he is interested in plowing and weeding indirectly. He may be interested in these latter also directly, if he enjoys the activity and the fresh air and the sunlight, but he will still have some indirect interest in them so long as he regards them as a means to the production of the directly and enjoyably consumable fruits. The existence of indirect value implies the existence of a direct value which belongs to the end. But its existence also implies that the person or value-subject is not exclusively interested in the end. There must be a genuine interest in the means also, considered as a means. Otherwise it has no value. If the man knows that something is a comparatively efficacious means to what he wants directly, and if he is a normal person, he will take an indirect interest in it. There is no real necessity of his taking an interest in it if he is not inclined to do so, as there is no necessity of his taking an interest in anything at all if he is not so inclined. Only if a man does not care about the means to getting what he wants he is a very abnormal sort of person; and in this case the means is valueless to him as a means. I think that many people misunderstand this matter of instrumental goods, asserting that the only genuine interest is in the end, and that the means has value but is not the object of any interest. My phrase 'indirect interest' may tend to confirm this error if the precise meaning I have given it is not kept clearly in mind. The word 'indirect' suggests meditation; but there is no more meditation between the value-subject and the object of such an interest than there is between the same in the case of a so-called direct interest. One is just as direct as the other so far as things lying between interest and object are concerned. But in calling an interest in a means qua means an indirect interest I simply intend that the object is regarded as an instrumentality. I am naming the interest after the way in which its object is regarded. This may be taken as no more than a somewhat arbitrary tag.

I propose to use the word goodness in a wider sense than value, and to make it cover both value (all value, primary and secondary) and utility. 'Utility' I shall use somewhat in the economic sense of the word. Utility is the service which a thing renders or has rendered in the production of some valuable object or of some positive interest. It is usefulness. It is efficaciousness in establishing someone's welfare or happiness, by aiding in the creation either of the object of his liking, or of his positive feeling-attitude itself. A thing can be useful without being known, like vitamins before they were discovered, or like the astronomical and geological changes which, before their existence was suspected, made the earth and made it

inhabitable by man, and made man. Probably everything in the universe and thru all past time has utility, since if it were or had been different from what it is or was, some good and some favoring interest of somebody would be less than they are. Our knowledge of what effect anything has, or has had, upon what good, is unnecessary to its having that effect and thus to its having utility. Knowledge is of course absolutely essential for the existence of secondary value, if this is a function of interest. One cannot be interested in what he does not know anything about. To be an object of interest is to be known. All unknown objects are valueless. But clearly many of them are good, and many are bad. A million unknown and therefore unvalued things and forces operate now, and have ever operated, and will operate in the future, directly or indirectly upon the lives of the higher animals for weal or woe; and what does good for us is good for us, and what does ill is bad, whether or not we or anybody knows about the fact. Probably there is nothing in the universe, nor, probably, has there ever been anything, but has done some good to someone, and most likely to many, and also some evil to many. Probably everything that ever has been is both good and bad on a multitude of scores, since, if everything had been different from what it was, a multitude of people would not have been quite as well off, nor would a multitude have been quite as poorly off, as they actually are. These two multitudes may partly or wholly coincide, one causal factor being a blessing to most or all individuals in one aspect of their lives, and a curse to the same individuals in another aspect.

While goodness and badness are characteristics which are not confined to the objects of interests or to interests in objects, they are nevertheless always either a feeling or else relative to some feeling-attitude. Primary value, a feeling, is subjective goodness-badness. Secondary value, a meaning, is objective goodness-badness. And known or unknown objects possessing utility have a goodness which is related indirectly thru a causal or other physical connection with some intentless feeling or else with some interest-object. Useful things are good and useful because they are connected causally or in some other way with a primary value, or with something that has secondary value, or with both. However remote a good may be from the feeling upon which its goodness depends, there is nevertheless invariably some interest which supports it. The roots of all goodness are subjective. Value and utility are incurably infected with subjectivism. To attempt to escape from this is folly.

I should here note and attempt to avoid certain ambiguities in the use of the words good, goodness, value, and valuable. The adjective 'good' may modify, among other things, any noun which signifies the object of a positive interest. The book that I like is a good book because I like it. 'Good' is also a noun standing for such an object. The book is a good. To say that a good is good is not necessarily to use the word 'is' in the sense of identity. To say that goods are physical objects is acceptable common usage and acceptable economic usage. Dry goods and wet goods and production goods and consumption goods are for the most part either solids or gasses or liquids. Goodness is the abstract tertiary quality possessed by these objects, and consists in the fact that they are the objects of positive interests. Goodness is also a quality possessed by all useful objects even if they are not the objects of any interest. And objects having that form of

goodness which is utility are goods, as well as good. Value is all goodness that is not mere utility. It is a tertiary quality or a meaning or a relation of the objects of positive interest; or else it is a feeling. The word 'valuable' means the same as the adjective good, except that good can modify nouns standing for things which have mere utility, while valuable should modify only those which stand for things that are actually the objects of positive interests.

There is now a widely prevalent usage which makes 'value' a name for the valuable object, as well as for the quality of goodness which the object possesses. People talk about values when they mean goods, or good and valuable objects. This is not strictly parallel to the double use of 'good' as noun meaning the valuable object, and as adjective modifying the name of the object, for 'value' is not an adjective modifying the name of the object. Value is the quality, and corresponds, not to good, but to goodness. Good is being used for the thing and also as adjective to modify the thing. Value is being used as a name for the thing and as a name for the quality of the thing. This ambiguous use of value has become especially prevalent among philosophers, and has led to much confusion. Urban and Perry both define value as the tertiary quality, and both use it occasionally for the object which has the value, without pointing out that they are changing the meaning of the term. In his chapter entitled "Value as any object of any interest," Perry is at great pains to show that value is not the object of any interest at all, but is a quality or relation that any object of any interest has. If value ever becomes the object of any interest, as it does, in this chapter, become the object of Mr. Perry's theoretical interest, the interest that it is the object of must necessarily be different from the original interest that generated the value by having some other object, which has the value, as its object. The character of value may have value. Then it will both be a value and have a value. And the value that it is and the value that it has are two different values. If a man has blue eyes he is not blue eyes. If he has a grandfather he is not that grandfather. He may be another grandfather. If a man has courage he is courageous but is not identical with courage. If a thing has value it is valuable, but, even tho it be a value, it cannot be identical with the value that it has.

Perry criticized Dewey in 1917 for mixing up the object valued with the value of the object and calling them by the same name.¹⁴ Dewey continued to use the word in the two senses.¹⁵ In 1923 he invented the barbaric word 'valuity' to stand for the quality when he used 'value' for the object that had it, but he did not stick to this distinction even in the article in which it appears.¹⁶

My contention is not that 'value' should not be used to mean a good object. I simply insist that if it is so used it should be so defined. And if it is to be used in two different senses, both should be defined with utmost care.

The word 'valuable' is also used at times rather loosely to mean the thing which is valuable. A man may check his valuables at the office when he goes swimming. This is like the extension of the

14—14 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1917, p. 170.

15—34 *Philosophical Review*, 1925, p. 324.

20 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1923, p. 618.

16—20 *Journal of Philosophy*, 1923, p. 618, 620.

terms 'intellectual' and 'religious' from their original use as adjectives modifying the nouns which stand for people having these qualities, to the status of nouns standing for the people themselves. In the tradition of Catholicism a 'religious' is a person of a certain type. And today in Anglo-Saxondom a so-called 'intellectual' is a person of another type. But it will only confuse philosophy to use the word 'valuable' interchangeably as an adjective modifying the name of a good object and as a noun standing for the object itself. And the double use of the word 'value', to mean both the good object and the quality of goodness that this object has, will also, in the absence of two very precise definitions, serve only to confuse a value theory.

When I say value I mean a quality or relation of an external object unless I am talking about primary value, in which case I mean a feeling. Value is an object of interest only in the most exceptional circumstances.

V—Intrinsic Value.

It should be clear that secondary value can never be intrinsic. What is loosely and popularly called intrinsic value is nothing of the sort. It is what I have called direct value. The objects of direct interests are often called intrinsic goods, or things 'good in themselves'. I do not know what the word 'in' means in this latter phrase. The whole expression means that the things are valued on account of qualities which they possess that would, on a common sense view, be called intrinsic or non-instrumental. But there is no excuse for calling the values of these things intrinsic, unless the word is a mere arbitrary tag. The word 'intrinsic', when applied to any quality, is properly used as G. E. Moore has used it, to mean that the thing can still possess the quality even if it exists quite alone.¹⁷ No external good can possibly exist as a good quite alone. There must also be an interest which has it for an object. If it exists quite alone the interest does not exist and it is not a good. The adjective 'intrinsic' is only and always strictly and properly applicable in the value field to primary value or subjective goodness. Given a positive feeling-tone, whether or not it is an aspect of what is or pretends to be an attitude toward something, and it is always a value experience, even if nothing else exists, not even the thing that it pretends to be an attitude toward. It is always and invariably just the value that it is and nothing else. Ontologically, of course, it is always, so far as our experience shows, dependent upon certain neural events. But axiologically it is absolute. Its value quality is intrinsic and non-derivative. On this view only a living being or his experience can have intrinsic value. And this value which he or she has is not a value to anybody, not even to his or her self. It is part of his or her self. It is not moral goodness or virtue. It is the subjective feeling of pleasantness and a part of the value experience.

Mr. Ralph Barton Perry has attempted, I think in vain, to retain intrinsic objective value in a general theory of value with which I am in substantial accord, and to which I am indebted for much that here appears. He is replying to Mr. G. E. Moore's contention that on such a view as his, value is always borrowed and never owned, and that it

17—Moore, G. E., *Ethics*, p. 65, 162. Henry Holt, N. Y., not dated; probably about 1910. See also Blake, R. M., *Why Not Hedonism?* in *International Journal of Ethics*, Oct. 1926, Vol. 37, p. 2.

shines with a reflected glory only. He asserts that a thing may be intrinsically valuable if you consider it together with the interest that is taken in it.¹⁸ "—the primrose as enjoyed is intrinsically good". The "object desired for itself — does possess value in itself". But Moore's charge, that if value is a function of interest it's always borrowed and never owned, surely expresses the exact truth about the value of all objects of interest qua objects of interest. The value that Perry defined in his chapter entitled "Value as any object of any interest" is necessarily a borrowed value.¹⁹ It is secondary value, the value of external objects. We do not predicate value broadly and indiscriminately of the whole composed of an interest and its object. We say that the object has objective value. And I say that the interest has primary value. If we do somewhat arbitrarily create a unity of an interest and its object, then it is true that that whole possesses value within itself, which it could still retain even if it existed quite alone. Indeed it contains both kinds of value, primary and secondary, the former in the interest and the latter imputed to the object. Perry seems clearly aware thruout his treatise of only the latter. This is the one that he defines. The former he never mentions specifically or attempts to define or distinguish from the latter. But on occasions he recognizes that there is some sort of value in the interest itself, and, like Urban, he tries to read over into this experience the same value that he finds in its object.

The object of an interest can only possess what is strictly intrinsic value if it is alive, which it may be in addition to being the object of the interest. This intrinsic value does not depend on the interest being taken in the object; it is a quality belonging to the object itself. It is the quality of subjective pleasantness-unpleasantness, or positive-negative feeling-tone. This intrinsic primary value may be only very remotely and indirectly related or not related at all to the secondary value possessed by the object. As such the primary value is never the object of a favoring interest. It is a major blemish in the work of many hedonistic writers that they have said or suggested that primary value (pleasure as a feeling) is as such and necessarily the object of such an interest. Neither primary value nor anything else is ever necessarily the object of any interest. What shall be the object of an interest depends upon the selection of the interest itself. So far as the theory of value is concerned a man can want anything at all that he likes or nothing at all if he does not like. An object cannot require a disinclined interest to pursue it. There is then nothing of which it can be truly said that it necessarily possesses secondary value or objective goodness. A primary value is not, as such, good. It is subjective goodness. The thing that possesses it, the total pleasant experience, is, as such, good. This is a subjective good. This alone is an intrinsic good and has intrinsic value. Nothing except such an experience can ever be an intrinsic good, or have intrinsic value.

18—General Theory of Value, p. 132-134.

19—Ibid, p. 124.

CHAPTER II.

A RE- INTERPRETATION OF HEDONISM.

As S. C. Pepper has said,¹ the theory that value is based on interest is just hedonism in a new dress. It is what ancient and modern hedonists have had on their minds and have somewhat inadequately expressed. Their more formal pronouncements are not strictly in accord with it. But it can be discerned in their writings and is the core of truth in these. This core of truth may be summed up in the two doctrines (1) of axiological ego-centrism, and (2) of feeling or hedonic-tone as the value fundamental. I shall attempt to show that the Epicureans and Utilitarians, in spite of much confusion of thought, did mean to teach these two theories. Their slogan that 'pleasure is the good' is an odd and ambiguous way of expressing them. Pleasure has many meanings. In one of these, where it means feeling-tone, the slogan is false if taken literally, but the real truth is nevertheless suggested in regard to the nature of the value fundamental; and in both this sense and another, where pleasure means any object of any favorable interest, the notion of ego-centrism is expressed or suggested.

There are eight or more meanings for the word pleasure.

(1) It is the contrast term for work. Any total activity and experience which is carried on by way of recreation is pleasure. Vacation activities, such as sport, dancing, music, travel, and all kinds of gay festivities such as participating in water carnivals with displays of fire-works, are pleasure in this sense.

(2) It may mean thrill or ecstasy, a complex of organic sensations.

(3) It may mean sensuality, which, it must be remembered, includes some legitimate forms among the many wicked ones. If indulged in at the right time and place, and in the right manner, a hot shower or an application of bay rum is not subject to moral condemnation in spite of its appeal to the senses.

(4) Pleasure has been used to mean simply the absence of pain. Epicurus so used it part of the time, presumably in his more saintly and ascetic moods.

(5) It may mean positive feeling-tone.

(6) It may mean any total experience having a positive feeling-tone or subjective pleasantness. It is so used by Woodworth² and Sidgewick.³

(7) It may mean any object of any positive direct interest. Thus our work becomes a pleasure as soon as we prosecute it, not merely as a means to our livelihood, but also because we enjoy the thing itself apart from all instrumentality. Here a pleasure is anything

1—U. of Cal. Pub. in Phil., Vol. 4, p. 110, Berkeley 1923.

2—Woodworth, R. S., Psychology, p. 173. Holt. N. Y., 1923 (first edition 1921).

3—Sidgewick, H., Methods of Ethics, p. 127, 129, 397. Macmillan, London, 1907. Seventh edition. (First edition 1874.)

which is objectively pleasant by reason of being the object of a direct interest. It is anything which has direct secondary value or direct objective pleasantness. A thing is not a pleasure by reason of having indirect secondary value.

(8) In the last sense that I shall mention, which includes the seventh sense, pleasure is any object of any positive interest whatever. It is anything that we like on any score, whether because of its efficacy or because of so-called intrinsic qualities. It is anything which has secondary value, direct or indirect. Using pleasure in this sense, and using the word good in the narrow sense in which the hedonists used it, it is true that pleasure is the good. ('Good' should also cover what has utility and what has subjective goodness or primary value.)

In this last sense we simply mean by pleasure that which is objectively pleasant, just as in the sixth sense we meant that which is subjectively pleasant. Calling pleasure pleasant is an inartistic use of language and should not be recommended except for the fact that the usage has been established as customary. It is not courage that is courageous. But in certain senses pleasure is pleasant without self contradiction. That is, pleasure in the sixth sense is pleasant by reason of the presence in it of pleasure in the fifth sense. And pleasure in the seventh sense is pleasant by reason of its being the object of a pleasure in the fifth sense which has intent and which is directed toward the seventh-sense-pleasure on account of properties of the latter which would, on a common sense view, be called intrinsic. And pleasure in the eighth sense is pleasant by reason of its being the object of a pleasure in the fifth sense which has intent and which is directed toward the eighth-sense-pleasure on account of any properties of the latter whatever, intrinsic or instrumental or what not. It is self contradictory for a pleasure to be pleasant only if it is so by reason of the presence in it, or by reason of its relation to, pleasure in the same sense.

It should be noted here that in view of (6) and (8) pleasantness is synonymous with positive value and unpleasantness with negative value. Subjective pleasantness is primary value and objective pleasantness is secondary value, and there are no other kinds of value or of pleasantness than these.

The legitimacy of using pleasure in the eighth sense may be denied on the ground that it is a common experience to find that the means to a good and valuable and pleasant end is itself often no pleasure at all. Is the drudgery pleasant which is instrumental to a man's holding his job? This apparently is an unpleasant means to a pleasant end. It is certainly good and valuable as a means. Then is pleasure really the good?

We must admit that drudgery is partly unpleasant. And to that extent it is evil. It is a bore. It is tiring. It is the object of a negative feeling-attitude. It is bad. Hedonistically speaking it is a pain. But if it serves to keep a man's job for him it is also a pleasure. He knows that it is the best way to hold on to his position. And his position enables him to have a certain amount of money, which pleases him, and a certain social eminence, which also pleases him. Thus he has two (at least two) interests in the drudgery which are in conflict. He tends to shun it as a bore and he tends to embrace it as a means to wealth and honor and social position. The question as to which interest is the stronger is determined

by which one wins in the conflict. If he performs the drudgery, that means that he has a greater (or deeper or more intense or higher or even wider) positive instrumental interest in the drudgery as a means to the ends which he likes directly, than a favorable direct interest in avoiding-the-drudgery-and-losing-the-wealth-and-eminence. I am of course assuming that he knows that the drudgery is the most efficacious and least unpleasant means to the directly desired end. The drudgery and the end are then linked by a natural necessity over which he has no control. Being intelligent he sees the connection and treats the two as a unit, and prefers taking both to going without both. If there were any more efficacious or less unpleasant means that he knew of to the same end he would of course be unwise not to take this. But in the absence of such, if he is rational he does have a positive instrumental interest in the drudgery, due to its connection with the wealth and eminence. This interest has a positive feeling-tone. It is a favorable feeling toward the drudgery. The drudgery in this aspect as an instrumentality surely does please him. He may not talk much in glowing terms about this aspect of it. As he lets his imagination play over it he may be chiefly concerned with its other aspect, its dullness which displeases him. But he actually stays with it voluntarily for hours, week in week out, every day except Sunday. This, it seems to me, proves his positive interest in it. And it must satisfy or please this interest. It must satisfy or please him as this interest (these two sentences mean the same thing. He is all his interests. Each is an aspect or subordinate interest included under his personality interest. To have an interest and to be an interest are the same thing; tho to have a value and to be a value are not the same thing). If it did not satisfy his interest he would not do it voluntarily. As long as he keeps at it without being put thru the motions by some superior physical power he is doing it because he predominantly likes to do it; he prefers to do it; doing it is a pleasure, and is pleasant, in the sense that doing it satisfies or pleases his predominant interest. If this were not so he would stop. He is also displeased with it as a bore, but not so much as he is pleased with it as an instrumentality. It must not be supposed that in the means-end situation the only interest is in the end. There is one interest which selects the means as its object and one which selects the end. There are two easily distinguishable interests, one dependent upon the other.

The object of every choice that a man makes is invariably the greatest pleasure to him at the time. If he is wise it is also the greatest pleasure to him in the long run. To use the quaint language of Bentham, he will choose the pleasure which is most intense, long enduring, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure, and extended; this he will do to the extent that he is sane and rational. But everybody always chooses what is the greatest pleasure at the time of the choice; for a choice expresses the strongest interest, in a conflict, and the object of the strongest interest is by definition (by the eighth definition) the greatest pleasure. The greatest pleasure (in the eighth sense) is so constituted by the direction at it of the strongest positive feeling-attitude in the soul at the time; that is, by the most intense fifth-sense-pleasure endowed with an intent directed at the eighth-sense-pleasure. Choice is not determined by the quantity of pleasure as feeling in the end or object. If a man is rational the pleasure as feeling in the object of interest will be taken

into consideration; but this is not the sole determining factor even then. Choice is always determined by the quantity or strength of the fifth-sense-pleasure in the interest which is taken in the object, that is, which has the object as its object; which interest is actually located in the soul of the interested personality. The key fact in value is the pleasure at the source of our interests. Value is utterly impossible in the absence of feeling. Feeling is one-dimensional, and is either subjective pleasantness or unpleasantness. Positive value is always pleasantness of one kind or another. And pleasures in the sixth, seventh, and eighth senses are the only things that have it. These pleasures, together with such things as have mere utility, make up all the goods in the universe.

In the Utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill states that pleasure in the seventh sense is the good. He also regards pleasure in the fifth and sixth senses as the good. He never seems to realize that he is expounding more than one doctrine. Power and fame, he says, were originally desired primarily as a means to pleasure or happiness. Virtue and money were originally desired purely as such a means. But by association with pleasure these things became part of the end. They are now desired for themselves and are parts of or ingredients in happiness.⁴ Happiness then, which is supposed to be just the sum or perhaps the system of the pleasures of a man's life, has as elements in it certain solid objects like money, which are not feelings at all, and other less tangible things like power, fame, and virtue, which also are not feelings. These things, then, must be pleasures, and pleasure is evidently being used for the complementary object of any direct favorable interest, whatever that object may be,—an experience or a material object or an ideal or what not. This is pleasure in the seventh sense.

He also says in his notes to his father's *Analysis of the Human Mind*,⁵ that wealth, power, and dignity, which are not in their own natures pleasures but the causes of pleasures, become so closely associated with pleasure and pain that they are desired for themselves. If pleasure were a feeling it would seem superfluous to say that they were not in their own natures pleasures. And the implication of his words is that these things become pleasures by becoming the objects of direct interests instead of being merely the objects of indirect interests which they were at first. And on the next page⁶ he says that a concern for others is an ultimate fact of our nature, and that, assuming the presence in us of this moral feeling, the good of others is itself a pleasure to us. This good of theirs is not, of course, the moral feeling in us. Their good and our feeling are different. Therefore our pleasure and our feeling are different. Our pleasure is the object of our feeling here. It is a pleasure to me to find Mill recognizing, in this passage, intent-feelings at the source of interest. Most hedonists do not see very clearly that a feeling can have an intent.

4—Utilitarianism, p. 33-35. Everyman. Dutton, N. Y., 1922. The first edition of the Utilitarianism was 1863.

5—Mill, James, *Analysis of the Human Mind*, Vol. 2, p. 307-308. Longmans Green, London, 1869. Edited by J. S. Mill (references are unchanged in edition of 1878. The first edition of the *Analysis* was 1829).

6—Ibid, 309.

And in the Utilitarianism Mill says "—any given pleasure, as music for instance".⁷ Does he mean that music is a pleasure because we have a positive feeling toward it, or because the immediate experience of it is pleasant? Is this the seventh or sixth sense of pleasure? I think that he probably has both meanings in mind.

He also says "—to think of an object as desirable (except for the sake of its consequences) and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing".⁸ This reiterates his refusal to admit that pleasure in the eighth sense is pleasant. And so he would not call it pleasure. But he could hardly say more clearly that what I have called pleasure in the seventh sense is 'the pleasant'. He is saying that everything with direct secondary value is pleasant. Since he uses pleasure and 'the pleasant' interchangeably, this is the equivalent of saying that my seventh sense of the word pleasure is legitimate. And it must be remembered that the extension of the seventh sense is identical with a large part of the extension of the eighth.

Thus it is clear that Mill uses the words pleasure and pleasantness in an objective sense, in which they do not signify a feeling nor anything like a feeling. He also uses them in the sense of feeling. Tho he says that these various objects of interest are identical with pleasure and happiness, he also asserts that life would be ill provided with sources of happiness if nature had not provided that things originally indifferent, but "conducive to, or otherwise associated with, the satisfaction of our primitive desires, become in themselves sources of pleasure".⁹ Nature does not then provide that these things should become pleasure itself. From the way in which he speaks he does not seem to know that he has changed the meaning of the word pleasure from the sixth or seventh senses to the fifth. He seems to think that he is hammering home the doctrine which he enunciated above, that things are identical with pleasure and with parts of happiness. He emphasizes this by saying that it is in themselves that the things become sources of happiness. But of course happiness and what is in itself the source of it are not quite identical.

And in a number of places pleasure is used to mean feeling, while pleasant and pleasurable characterize the thing which has it, or, as we say, gives it, or is the object of delight. I have already noted that he says that any object of any positive direct interest is pleasant. He also speaks in the *Analysis of the pleasure* afforded by music,¹⁰ tho he spoke in the *Utilitarianism* of music as a pleasure. He also says that acts beneficial to others become pleasurable in themselves, and that the idea of pleasure is intrinsically pleasurable.¹¹ And the end is something pleasurable.¹² And all desirable things are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.¹³ In all these cases pleasure means feeling.

That so many critics, with the conflicting theories before them in

7—Everyman, p. 34.

8—Ibid, p. 36.

9—Everyman, p. 35.

10—*Analysis of the Human Mind*, II, p.241-242.

11—Ibid, p. 308.

12—Ibid, p. 373.

13—*Utilitarianism*, p. 6.

the hedonistic canon, should have thought that the only thing meant by pleasure was feeling, which is subjective goodness and not 'the good', and should have ignored the view that pleasure is the object of a positive interest, which really is the good, is perhaps natural in view of the extremely unsympathetic attitude that most of them took toward hedonism. They could not contemplate with equanimity any theory which gave non-eulogistic titles, like pleasure and interest, to fundamental moral facts. And it is not only the enemies of the pleasure philosophy who have failed to understand it. The friends and allies too have been led astray. Both Green and Sidgwick fail to get Mill's idea in chapter four of the Utilitarianism, where Mill says that music and virtue and power, etc., are pleasures and are elements in happiness.

Sidgwick says in a note,¹⁴ "It is more remarkable to find J. S. Mill—declaring that 'money'—no less than 'power' or 'fame'—comes by association of ideas to be 'a part of happiness', an 'ingredient in the individual's conception of happiness'. But this seems to be a mere looseness of phraseology, venial in a treatise aiming at a popular style; since Mill has expressly said that 'by happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain,' and he cannot mean that money is either the one or the other." Sidgwick adds that Mill probably meant to make the distinction, in his talk about things becoming pleasures when they had not been pleasures before, between direct and instrumental goods. This is correct, but it is not all that Mill meant. Mill does say that money is a pleasure, and I think that he meant what he said. It is ordinary usage in the English language to say that a thing that we like is a pleasure to us. If Sidgwick insists that he cannot mean it because he has just used pleasure in a different sense, and does not point out any change in the meaning of his word, I reply that that is no proof. Many a man has used his words very precisely in several senses without noting the fact. And when a man does this there is no law to the effect that there is only one of the senses that he means. And if there were, the seventh sense of pleasure might be the one, and not the fifth. Mill is so clear, in spots, that he means pleasure in the seventh sense, and it is so true that pleasure in this sense is a good, that I cannot dismiss the passage as a mere lapse, venial or otherwise. It is perhaps a lapse from the more official formulations of hedonism. But sub specie aeternitatis it is no lapse at all. Rather it is the divine truth bursting forth thru the mists of error and of intellectual confusion.

Green in one place sees more in Mill's chapter than Sidgwick does. Green admits that Mill really means that the complementary objects of positive interest are parts of the man's happiness, and that if pleasure means them, it is really and truly the good. And, what is more, he says that this is perfectly true. But then he goes on to assert that this is simply the equivalent of his theory that a good object is one in which we seek self-satisfaction.¹⁵ If that is actually what Green means by seeking self-satisfaction in things, why that is fine. But I think that he is just as ambiguous about his self-satisfaction as the hedonists are about their pleasure. He uses it in sev-

14—Methods of Ethics, p. 93.

15—Green, T. H., *Prolegomena to Ethics*, sect. 167-171. Oxford Press 1924 (first edition 1883).

eral senses without realizing that he is doing so. Self-satisfaction in the last analysis is simply the hedonists' pleasure with the colored light from a cathedral window falling across it, tho Green denies this.¹⁶ He says that the hedonists identify the good with the pleasant, while he makes it that which satisfies some desire.¹⁷ I think that he meant by desire any positive interest. And it should be clear that anything that satisfies any positive interest falls within the extension of 'the pleasant', as he virtually admits in another place.¹⁸ He says that the hedonists maintained that the good was the pleasant,¹⁹ and half a page farther on he says that they meant that it was pleasure. He thus would seem to have all but recognized that they were using pleasure to mean the pleasant, and that their theory was no different from his own. But his dominant notion is certainly that when the hedonists said pleasure they meant feeling. He says in one place, like Sidgwick, that Mill confuses the pleasure which ensues upon the satisfaction of desire with the object of desire.²⁰ He thinks here that Mill's use of pleasure in the seventh sense was a mistake from Mill's point of view. But it is only a mistake from the point of view of the most official formulations of hedonism. It is the plain truth of the matter, as Green himself admits;²¹ and this ought to be emphasized.

Green shows how Butler refuted the hedonists,²² and does not see that therein his own moral theory is equally refuted. Butler said, what is perfectly true, that some interests terminate in their objects. The man wants the beef steak, not as a means to any pleasure, and not as a means to anything; not for the sake of anything; not in the hope of finding self-satisfaction in it. He is just hungry and wants the beef steak itself. This is no desire for pleasure. Hedonism (taking pleasure in its fifth sense) is refuted. But so is Green's theory. Green's negative criticisms are fine as applied to hedonism in the fifth sense and so are Butler's. But these very criticisms are applicable and fatal to some of Green's own doctrines as well as to some of Butler's. Green's oft repeated proposition that we seek self-satisfaction in the object of desire means most of the time that the self-satisfaction is the object of direct interest and that the object itself is an object of instrumental interest. It is the self-satisfaction which we are always primarily seeking. Sometimes it is in one object and sometimes it is in another. But the object is only good so far as it contains this sacred essence. The object is merely desired as a means to this further end, and in Butler's words, the interest in this case never terminates upon its apparent object. Of course, Green may be using self-satisfaction metaphorically, and there may be a sixth, seventh, and eighth meaning for it besides the fifth one. I simply wish to show that Green cannot explain the difficulties and ambiguities in hedonism; his own doctrine contains these very same difficulties and ambiguities, unnoticed by him as theirs were by them. Doubtless he and the men of his school had a certain truth in

16—Green, *Prolegomena*, sect. 222.

17—Ibid, sect. 171.

18—Ibid, sect. 168.

19—Ibid, sect. 171.

20—Ibid, sect. 165.

21—Ibid, sect. 167, 170.

22—Ibid, sect. 161.

the back of their heads which they failed perfectly to express, and doubtless it was not essentially different from the one which the hedonists had, for the most part in the back of their heads. And doubtless this truth was that a man's self, that is, his feeling-attitudes or interests, is the source of all desire and of all valuation, and that the process of living a good life (not just the end of the process) is the process of realizing or satisfying or pleasing this self. The Hegelians however spoil their value theory by treating the relation of the individual personality to society and to the universe as if it were analogous to the relation of subordinate interests in a personality to the total personality itself. They have no proper sense for the limits of the personality nor for its dependence upon its biological basis. The aberrations of their metaphysics render their ethical theories of very little genuine assistance to the moral philosopher.

The use of the word pleasure in the sense of the object of a positive interest, which object is generally no feeling at all, is to be found in a number of other writers.

Aristotle suggests it in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*,²³ when he states that the pleasures involved in the exercise of the different faculties vary greatly, and illustrates this by the fact that a man prefers gold to hay, while a donkey prefers hay to gold, and by the fact that different things please different men. In order to illustrate how pleasures vary he can only point to how the things that please vary. And none of the things that he points to as things that please are feelings.

Herbert Spencer does substantially the same thing in his *Data of Ethics*.²⁴ He argues that people do not agree as to the nature of happiness, contrary to Bentham's assertion. He contends that since different people like different things, it follows that happiness is a different thing for each. Happiness then must be the things that people like, and not necessarily feelings, and generally not feelings.

Bentham's words, which Spencer thinks he is contradicting, are as follows: "What happiness is every man knows, because, what pleasure is, every man knows, and what pain is every man knows"; while there is much dispute as to what justice is.²⁵ Justice is only a means to happiness. When a man talks like this he is driving at the approximate truth that people know what they want. When a man is pleased he knows it. When he is pained he knows it. And he knows roughly what will please him and what will pain him in the future. The pleasure and the happiness to which Bentham here refers are simply whatever objects please him. Of course Bentham is conscious of his official formulation, that pleasure as a feeling is the good, most of the time. He does not let the real truth slip out very often.

Spencer thinks that he disagrees with Bentham, but really he does not. People disagree as to what objects shall make up their happiness, as Spencer says, but they all agree that whatever each man likes is happiness for him, as Bentham says. And the genuine dis-

23—See Peters trans., Bk. 10, Ch. 5, sect. 7-9.

24—Ch. 9, sect. 61.

25—Bentham, Works, Vol. 9, p. 123, col. I. Collected and edited by John Bowring. Edinburgh, 1838. This quotation is from the Constitutional Code, Book I, Ch. 16.

agreement which Spencer notes would not lead to any conflict if everyone would mind his own business and if there were enough goods to provide for all.

In one other place Bentham seems to step aside from the doctrine generally attributed to him. At the beginning of Chapter four of the *Principles of Morals and Legislation* he says that the value of a pleasure is its force. Its value or force in influencing conduct is the means thru which the legislator controls the behavior of the citizen. Either he is slipping over into a theory of teleological causation which is foreign to his general view of things, or else he is not using value as he himself uses it when he speaks of the value of things other than pleasure. The value of things other than pleasure is for him what I call secondary value. This is no force. It is importance and meaning. Pleasure as a feeling is a force that controls voluntary action. But it is at the source of the interest and is not generally the object of interest. It is primary value and is not ordinarily what has secondary value. And Bentham may have caught a fleeting glimpse of this truth in saying that the value of a pleasure is the force of it.

Bowring, or whoever wrote the *Deontology*, suggests this same view when he asserts that the value of a pleasure depends upon its intensity, duration, and extent, while its magnitude depends upon its intensity and duration.²⁶ Then by the worth of a pleasure he does not mean anything very different from its quantity or strength. If pleasure is a feeling and if its value means its quantity or strength or force, then this value is not what most people mean by value. It is not the secondary value which even hedonists mean when they are talking about the value of anything else but pleasure. If the value of pleasure as a feeling is its strength, then it is not valuable as the object of any interest. It is not the goal of our efforts. It is not the good. It is primary value located at the source of interest. Bowring certainly verges somewhere near this view.

Other statements in the *Deontology* are significant. We find that no man can let another decide for him what is pleasure.²⁷ That is pleasure which a man's judgment "recommends and recognizes to his feelings as pleasure".²⁸ Then pleasure is what the man himself really wants. It is what he has a certain feeling toward, and not the feeling that he has toward it. Here pleasure in the seventh or eighth sense is recognized as the object of an intent-feeling. And again we find that every person is the only proper judge of what, with reference to himself, is pleasure, and what is pain.²⁹ All this is just saying over again what Bentham said in the *Constitutional Code* about everybody knowing what happiness and pleasure and pain were.

John Hill Burton, a disciple of Bentham, and a lawyer by profession, says, in an introduction to Bentham's works, of which he was one of the editors, that even self-sacrifice is "the pursuit of pleasure—the doing of that which it pleases a man to do,—the doing that which volition suggests".³⁰ Then the phrase 'pursuit of pleasure' is

²⁶—*Deontology*, Vol. 2, p. 20. By either Jeremy Bentham or John Bowring or both. 1834.

²⁷—*Deontology*, Vol. 1, p. 29.

²⁸—*Ibid*, p. 29.

²⁹—*Ibid*, p. 59.

³⁰—Bentham's Works, Vol. I, p. 23, col. 2.

a metaphor to express the truth that a man pursues whatever he is interested in; and then to say that pleasure is the good is to say that what I like is the good. Burton also says that the best equivalent of pleasure is will.³¹ This looks as if pleasure were being shoved back into the source and used there properly as an intent-feeling. And Burton also says that the events of Bentham's life were "a recourse to elements of pleasure and satisfaction for which vulgar and selfish minds have no appreciation".³² Then the complementary objects of Bentham's interests were elements of pleasure, i. e., were particular pleasures, and pleasure here does not mean a feeling but is used in the seventh or eighth sense.

If we turn to the ancient Epicureans we find that they used the word *voluptas*, which is translated pleasure, in several different senses, without seeming to realize what they were doing. The basic truth in their moral theory was the salutary axiological ego-centrism to which I have already referred. They borrowed a metaphysics to agree with this notion, and the formulations of their moral theories give it at least a metaphorical expression. They might have been clearer than they were. They should have been clearer than they were. But they were on the right track and deserved more credit than they got.

They saw the necessity of escaping from the Aristoteleo-Platonic scheme of things which located the heart of the value problem up in heaven. They adopted, with reservations, the Democritean system as by far the best alternative then available to this majestically spiritual ontology. They required a metaphysics which would leave the spirit free to blow whither it listed, untrammelled by the imposition ab extra of the higher intuitions of a seer of Plato's caliber. They lacked his vision and his ability and his genius. Their notion of the content of a good life was a poor thing in contrast with his. They cultivated in their garden the tender flower of moral philosophy, encompassed and threatened by a society which, so far as free citizenship and a rich and full life were concerned, had gone infinitely more to the dogs than had the society of Athens during the century which preceded Alexander's death. Change and decay were visible in and about and everywhere. Reflective and virtuous souls were definitely on the defensive. They were all but beaten in life's struggle. They were on the point of becoming saints. What they wanted was peace and quiet and rest. They were always tired. Considered as men they were a puny lot compared with the giants who preceded them. But the hard knocks of life had hammered securely into their heads one truth which never lodged permanently in the heads of any of the three greatest philosophers of Greece. And this truth was that the heart of man is the center of the moral universe. Their sense for this fundamental truth, so indirectly and circuitously expressed by their dogma that pleasure is the good, has recurrently won them followers among men of good sense, like Gassendi and Hobbes and the Utilitarians, in a world of European culture almost completely dominated by Platonic and Aristotelian and Christian orthodoxies.

The exact words and doctrine of Epicurus himself are difficult or impossible to discover. Doubtless he was less exact than most

31—Bentham's Works, Vol. 1, p. 22.

32—Ibid, p. 24.

hedonists in his thought and expression so that his very words are not worth discovering. We simply know from Diogenes Laertius that he taught that pleasure is the good, that virtue alone is invariably connected with pleasure, and that the absence of pain is the greatest pleasure.

Cicero's *De Finibus*, Books I and II, gives the most complete account we have, not perhaps of the doctrine of Epicurus, but of Epicureanism in the first century B. C. Cicero is little more than a translator who recasts a continuous discourse into the form of a dialogue. He says himself in the twelfth letter to Atticus that the thought is the thought of others, and that he only supplies the words, of which he has a copious flow. He points out the existence of at least two hedonistic *summa bona*, one the absence of pain, and the other positive pleasure.³³ We also find a number of rather vague statements as to the meaning of *voluptas* which suggest, I think, that this word is taken ambiguously in the senses five, six, seven and eight, in addition to sense four, which senses I have enumerated above in regard to the English word pleasure. These meanings are at least adumbrated, tho there seems to be no clear recognition of the distinctions between them, nor of the fact that the word is being used in more than at most two senses.

Voluptas is regarded as the value fundamental and also as the supreme end (of course no one thing could possibly be both of these at once). The only word that is used consistently for primary value is *iucunditas*, or the feeling of pleasure and delight. *Voluptas* sometimes means this, which is the true value fundamental, and sometimes it means the total experience which includes this, and sometimes it means the thing which stimulates this experience and thus would normally be the object of a favorable interest; such a thing is an objective good, a good in the sense in which the Epicureans meant good.

There are four statements as to what the word *voluptas* means, all highly ambiguous.

(1) "*Quia voluptatem hanc esse sentiunt omnes quam sensus accipiens movetur et incunditate quadem perfunditur.*"³⁴

(2) "*Omnes enim iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur Graece hedonen, Latine voluptatem vocant.*"³⁵

(3) "*In eo autem voluptas omnium Latine loquentium more ponitur, cum percipitur ea quae sensum aliquem moveat iucunditas.*"³⁶

(4) And Aristippus meant by *voluptas* that which even dumb cattle would mean by it if they could speak, "*id est qua*" (this refers back to *voluptas*) "*sensus dulciter ac iucunde movetur*"³⁷

Cicero's ambiguities are repeated in substance in Hobbes's Latin *Leviathan*. A comparison of this with the English version will serve to emphasize the truth of my contention that it is unwise to

33—Cicero, M. T., *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*. Loeb Classical Library. Putnam's, N. Y., 1921. Trans. and Int. by H. Rackham. (First printing of this volume 1914.) Page 100-101.

34—Ibid, p. 84.

35—Ibid, p. 86.

36—Ibid, p. 92.

37—Ibid, p. 100.

credit the hedonists with too single and precise a meaning for voluptas or pleasure.

The English rendering was published before the Latin.³⁸

Hobbes gives 'delight' as the equivalent of voluptas; "Itaque appetitus omnis amorque conjunctus est cum voluptate aliqua", which re-echoes the English version, "And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied by some Delight, more or less". This voluptate looks very much like feeling-tone. Here pleasure is delight and might have been rendered by iucunditate. Again, "Voluptatem aliae ab objecti praesentis sensione oriuntur, quae vocari possunt voluptates sensuales", was first uttered as, "Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object present: And these may be called Pleasures of Sense". Pleasure is still delight, and we are still dealing with a feeling. But in the next sentence pleasure means that which is pleasant. "Jucundum ergo est apparens bonum". Jucundum means pleasant. But the corresponding sentence in the English Leviathan reads, "Pleasure, therefore (or Delight) is the apparens, or sense of Good". Pleasure and delight still have the same meaning, but they no longer refer to any feeling. They are 'the pleasant', i. e., that which has value, either subjective or objective. This is the good itself. What appears good is, at the time, good. It can only really be evil by appearing, either in itself or in its consequences, badly at some other time.

Thus it appears that many hedonists have used the word pleasure to mean feeling, which is the value fundamental, and also to mean the object of positive interest whether or not it be a feeling, which is the good. These are utterly different things, and the vice of the hedonists lay in mixing them up. There are also some expressions of the hedonistic doctrine which, when taken literally, mean the false view of pleasure in the fifth or sixth senses as the objective good; but these must not be interpreted literally unless we are to commit the horrid sin of taking a man's metaphors to mean precisely what they say.

I think that an illustration from a non-philosophical writing will suffice to show that people commonly use the phrase 'I do it for the sake of pleasure' as a metaphorical expression to mean 'I like to do it'. In the New York Times for May 25th, 1928, there appears a dispatch from London which states that a medical missionary, Mr. K. G. Frazer, F. R. C. S., on furlough from the southern Sudan, appeals thru the London Times for contributions of used safety-razor blades to take back to his woolly-headed friends in Africa. These folks, he says, are experts at shaving each other's heads with dull blades. "If anybody wishes to post blades to my Edinburgh address I will take them back with me in the Autumn to the Sudan, where they will give real pleasure". Now I doubt if he means that the blades are literally to be used as a means to the production of positive feeling-tone, tho this is literally what he says. He means that the Sudanese like razor blades, and here they like them instrumentally. In the eighth sense the blades are a pleasure. Metaphorically they will be used for the sake of producing pleasure. But strictly

38—Hobbes, Thomas, Latin Works. Edited by Molesworth, Sir Wm., Vol. 3, p. 42-43. London, 1841. John Bohn pub. Leviathan, p. 25. Everyman. Dutton, N. Y. No date (first edition of Leviathan, 1651; first edition of Latin version, 1670).

the blades will be used as a means, not to the excitation of any feeling, but to the removal of aesthetically superfluous wool. The removal of this wool is itself a pleasure in the eighth sense, but doubtless Mr. Frazer was not thinking of it in this light. The whole expression which he uses simply means 'These people will like the razor blades'. The forms of language must not be taken too seriously. An entire sentence may have a meaning when certain words in it cannot be said to stand for anything real in the outside world, just as a word may stand for something outside of us, when the individual letters in it do not. The individual word pleasure in the last quoted sentence does not stand for anything in reality, unless it is used in the eighth sense, which probably it is not. But the whole sentence does stand for something in reality.

There is of course a pleasure as feeling involved in the liking of the Sudanese for razor blades. Their feeling toward the blades is a delight in the blades. It is a positive instrumental interest with the blades as its object. It is a pleasure with an intent. But the blades are not used as a means to give this pleasure. They do not 'give' it in any proper sense of the word give. If pleasure is a feeling, then to say that the blades give pleasure is simply a false proposition. And so are many statements by hedonists about people doing things because the doing of them will give pleasure. And so are Green's and Bradley's statements about people pursuing self-satisfaction and self-realization. It is only on special occasions that moral philosophers can be taken to mean exactly what they say. The true home of most of their deliberately formulated basic principles is the realm of metaphor. In this potentially charming sphere they may generally flicker and glow dimly with the light of truth.

I will note two glaring examples of failure to catch the inward meaning of hedonistic principles and metaphors. Paulsen argues that a people or nation will desire, say freedom, and will desire it absolutely, and not for the sake of pleasure or happiness. They will serve their ideal irrespective of any considerations of feeling-tone. "True", he says, "all action tending toward the realization of the ideal yields satisfaction. But no one cares whether this represents the greatest amount of pleasure obtainable by the whole. A nation does not reckon the cost of its ideal, it does not compute how much happiness may be won or lost in a war for its freedom or its honor, or even for its position among other nations. In order to realize its controlling ideal it recklessly sacrifices the interests and lives of individuals. And the individuals themselves desire it; even tho they dread the sacrifice as individuals, as members of the nation they desire that their country remain true to itself and to its ideal".³⁹ And, as a hedonist would say, this freedom or honor is, for this nation, and at this juncture, the greatest pleasure, or what gives the greatest pleasure. The nation's major interest is in freedom or honor. It is sacrificing its interests, but only its lesser interests, to this greater interest. It is thus sacrificing what gives less pleasure, metaphorically speaking, to what gives more pleasure, at the time. It has weighed this pleasure against the pleasures of its other interests, and found by comparing, weighing, and calculating, that this pleasure is greater than the sum of all the pleasures of or in the interests to be

39—Paulsen, F., *A System of Ethics*. Trans. by Thilly; p. 272-273. N. Y. 1899, Scribners.

sacrificed to it. That is, this one predominating interest is stronger than all the interests that conflict with it. The proof of its strength is its control of behavior. The nation goes to war simply because it is its pleasure so to do; that is, it does it voluntarily. No nation ever went to war except voluntarily, that is, except for pleasure. (I have followed Paulsen's terminology in saying that the nation pursues pleasure, when the more strictly accurate way of expressing what happens is to say that the individual people in the nation, who are determining its course of action, are all pursuing their own pleasure, i. e., acting voluntarily).

And the other example is in Rashdall.⁴⁰ He argues that desire is not merely for pleasure *qua* pleasure, but that pleasures vary in quality or kind, as well as in degree, and that at certain times we desire certain kinds of pleasure irrespective of their intensity or nearness or other advantages enumerated by Bentham. "The average wife-beating ruffian would probably admit on reflection that the pleasure of beating his wife on one particular occasion was not worth a pot of beer. But tender him the pot of beer when he is angry, and will the uplifted hand inevitably be lowered to grasp it?" No it will not, says Rashdall, and he is right. Nor would it be lowered if any pleasure however great were offered as an alternative. Then is it true that the man is engaged in the pursuit of pleasure? No he is not, if pleasure is a feeling and if we are not speaking in metaphor. But if we are speaking in metaphor, or if pleasure is not a feeling, perhaps yes. As the hedonist would say, when he is in that mood, nothing else is so great a pleasure as to strike. There is no pleasure in the whole universe, or out of it, so intense or strong (any metaphor you like) as that of striking his wife. You could not tempt him by offering him a greater pleasure because there is no greater pleasure, at that moment. Later on the situation may be different. The pot of beer may then deter him from doing something. But now the sympathetic section of his autonomic nervous system is inhibiting the cranio-sacral division, and beer is a mere irrelevancy. What is a pleasure and what is not a pleasure for a man depends upon his interest. A thing is no pleasure to a man if he does not like it. And instead of saying that striking his wife is the greatest possible pleasure at the time, using pleasure in the seventh or eighth sense, we might have said, in metaphorical language, that it gives the greatest possible pleasure, and that the man is pursuing this pleasure. Rashdall is taking this metaphor literally and thereby misunderstanding the essential hedonistic insight.

The more orthodox formulation of the hedonistic doctrine, in which pleasure in the fifth sense is regarded as the good, may, when taken literally to mean exactly what it says, be stated in a fairly plausible manner. It is, nevertheless, fallacious. The economists have adopted it and defended it and made it a corner stone of some of their theories. The gist of their argument is given rather neatly in the introduction to Wieser's *Natural Value*, in English translation. This introduction is by William Smart.⁴¹ We discover that

40—Rashdall, H., *The Theory of Good and Evil*. Oxford U. Press, 1924. (First edition 1907). Vol. I, p. 13-15.

41—Wieser, Friedrich von, *Natural Value*. Macmillan, London, 1893. (First German edition Prag, 1888). Trans by C. A. Malloch. Preface by William Smart. p. VI.

no external objects are intrinsically good. Their value is relative to man. We have here ego-centrism in values. Men do not desire goods in so far as if they could get satisfaction without the goods they would not bother with them. Smart concludes then that man's ultimate desire and sole direct interest is for and in satisfactions, and that other things are only valuable instrumentally. Satisfaction is the same as pleasure, and this is simply the argument for hedonism with pleasure taken in the fifth sense. This conclusion seems to flow directly from the ego-centric principle. But really it does not. Ego-centrism in values is basic and true, but pleasure as feeling is not the end.

We must admit the truth of Smart's assertion that if we could get satisfaction without any external objects we would not want them and they would be valueless. But the words 'if we could get satisfaction' are a metaphorical way of saying 'if we could get what we want', or 'if we could get the thing that will satisfy our interests'. This complementary object of our interests does not give satisfaction in the sense that it is a means to satisfaction; which, I take it, is what 'to give satisfaction' strictly speaking does mean. It does give satisfaction if, and only if, 'to give satisfaction' means 'to be the complementary object of a positive interest and thus to satisfy the interest'. To take the expression in this latter meaning is to take it somewhat metaphorically, and only when so taken is it true. When so taken it is clear that it does not imply that our ultimate direct interest is in satisfaction or pleasure itself.

It is quite true that if we could get satisfaction, i. e., if we could get what we want, without any external objects, we would not value them and they would have no value. This simply means that if we had no interest in external objects we would not value them, which proposition is a tautology and thus necessarily true. We might be interested only in our internal experiences or we might have no interests at all. But since we cannot get satisfaction without external objects, that is, since we are interested in them, they do have value. This value is not intrinsic. But neither is it always instrumental. Instrumental vs intrinsic is not a true antithesis when applied to values. The value of external objects may be a positive direct secondary value. We may be interested in the object itself, apart from any instrumental character which it may have. I do not say that we may be interested in the object 'in itself' nor 'for itself', because both 'in' and 'for' here are redundant. If we are interested in the object itself, a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction is involved, but this feeling is not the object of any desire or other interest. It is the feeling aspect of the interest itself. It is in the value subject. It is at the source of the interest. The interest is double ended, and Smart, and the hedonists in much of their philosophizing, simply put it at the wrong end. This is a venial error, because when their formulations of doctrine are taken, as they should be, metaphorically, they mean the eighth theory, which is the true one.

What I say of taking what look like expressions of the fifth theory metaphorically so that they mean the eighth, applies also in many cases to what look like expressions of the sixth. Hedonists, especially Sidgwick, have said that pleasure as a total pleasant experience is the good, and is good in proportion to its pleasantness. This is asserting that subjective pleasantness is the same as the value of a thing considered as an end, which is really secondary value. I am

sure that this is at times an inaccurate and metaphorical expression of the truth that the value of a thing as an end or object is its objective pleasantness. Subjective and objective pleasantness, primary and secondary value, are mixed up due to a failure to appreciate the double endedness of interest.

The fifth doctrine of hedonism, that pleasure as a feeling is the good, has been refuted, in its literal sense, by the Hegelians, to almost everybody's satisfaction. Their criticisms are sound as applied to the doctrine as they understood it. The defect of these dissertations on how pleasure is not the good, is their failure to recognize that in certain places the hedonists meant something very different from a feeling, or from a total subjectively pleasant experience, by the word pleasure. The great idealists never refute the seventh or eighth doctrine. In their hearts they believe it, and in their writings they vaguely express it. When in a few instances they catch a glimpse of it in a book by a hedonist they cry out that this is not hedonism.⁴² If the doctrine, that pleasure, as the object of positive interest, is the good, is not hedonism, at least it is a theory which has been held by many hedonists. They probably thought that it was hedonism. And I think that it is hedonism. I call it this partly because so many hedonists believed it, and partly because in it feeling or hedonic tone is the worth fundamental.

In thus defending hedonism I am not proposing that we adopt its language generally. The 'interest' terminology is better. I doubt not that pleasure is too ambiguous a word to be used at once freely and accurately and gracefully in literature. If to be clear you have to specify which of eight or more senses you mean every time you use the naughty word, you inevitably sacrifice at least beauty of expression. All that I contend is that, contrary to the opinions of many philosophers, the hedonistic theory of value, as expounded by its great protagonists, contains a very high percentage of truth.

42—Bradley, F. H., *Ethical Studies*, p. 93. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927 (first edition 1876).

Mackenzie, J. S., *A Manual of Ethics*, p. 232. Pub. Clive, London, 1927 (fifth edition).

CHAPTER III.

THE MAGNITUDE AND COMMENSURABILITY OF VALUE.

I—General Principles

The secondary values which are generated by one man's interests are not accurately commensurable with the secondary values generated by the interests of another man. Every good is a good for someone, and any good with which it can be very precisely compared, or, in general, very significantly compared, must be good for the same person. All values are, however, quantitative, and can in fact, under certain circumstances, be compared very accurately, in regard to their magnitude, with other values of the same person. The magnitude of the value varies exactly as the quantity, extent, intensity, strength, magnitude, or size (these are all synonymous in this connection) of the feeling which generates it. The more a man wants or likes a thing the more value it has for him. Every intent-feeling has a certain strength. There is no unit for measuring this, as there is none for measuring the value or goodness which it generates. It is never possible to say how many times stronger one feeling is than another. Mathematical accuracy is impossible here. But it is possible to say whether one feeling is stronger than another or weaker than another or quantitatively equal to another. All of a man's feelings might conceivably be brought into situations in which the relations of their strengths would thus be demonstrated. And since we can conveniently divide most goods into physical units (tho we cannot divide their goodness or value into any units) it is generally possible to say pretty exactly how much of any one good is the equivalent in value of a given amount of any other. And we can also generally determine how much of it is a trifle more than equivalent, and how much is a trifle less.

The situation in which the relative strengths of feelings and the relative magnitudes of the thereon dependent secondary values, are most clearly demonstrated, is the case where the feelings conflict, and an act of preference, involving sacrifice, is necessary. If a man wants to add to his stock of phonograph records, and has enough money to buy only one, and is interested, say, in six records, he will choose the one toward which he has the strongest positive feeling-attitude, or, as we might say, toward which he has the most favorable attitude, or the one that has the most value to him. This particular record, then, has more value than any other record, unless he was at the moment of choice quite indifferent as between two records and picked one arbitrarily, knowing that he might just as well have taken the other. If he was thus indifferent he knew it and another person could probably tell it by the way he acted. When he picks one he sacrifices the other records, which he also wants, to this one. Supposing he does not choose arbitrarily he sacrifices the lesser to the greater good. If, having picked the one he likes best, his funds are augmented so that he can afford another, he will take the one

which he likes best from among the remaining five, and it will be clear that its value will be less than that of the first one chosen, unless, as I have suggested, he chose in the first place arbitrarily, in which case its value will be equal to that of the first one chosen. But its value will be (in the absence of further arbitrary choices) more than that of any other record. And so a hierarchy of goods may be established thru acts of preference.

Conceivably any value may be measured against any other of the same man in an act of preference. The value of a phonograph record will be measured against the value of a lawn mower if a man has to choose between having the one or the other. And the value of a carpet will be measured against the value of a friendship, if a man finds that he has to choose between having the carpet and losing the friend on the one hand, or losing the carpet and having the friend on the other hand. W. S. Gilbert and Sir Arthur Sullivan on one occasion seem each to have measured the value of the other's friendship against the value of a carpet, and found the carpet more valuable (true, the price of the carpet was \$2,500).

Wicksteed has expressed this idea in a passage which is worth quoting at length.¹ "—the heterogeneous impulses and objects of desire or aversion which appeal to any individual, whether material or spiritual, personal or communal, present or future, actual or ideal, may all be regarded as comparable with each other; for we are, as a matter of fact, constantly comparing them, weighing them against each other, and deciding which is the heaviest. And the question, 'How much of this must I forgo to obtain so much of that?' is always relevant. If we are considering, for example, whether to live in the country or in the town, such different things as friendship and fresh air or fresh eggs may come into competition and comparison with each other. Shall I 'bury myself in the country,' where I shall see little of my dearest friends, but may hope for fresh eggs for breakfast, and fresh air all the day? Or shall I stay where I am, and continue to enjoy the society of my friends? I start at once thinking 'how much of the society of my friends must I expect to sacrifice? Will any of them come and see me? Shall I occasionally be able to go and see some of them?' The satisfactions and benefits I anticipate from a country life will compensate me for the loss of some of their society, but not for the loss of all of it. The price may be too high. In such a case as this the terms on which the alternatives are offered are matter of more or less vague surmise and conjecture, but the apparent dissimilarity of the several satisfactions² themselves does not prevent the comparison, nor does it prevent the quantitative element from affecting my decision. Using the term price then in its widest extension, we may say that all the objects of repulsion or attraction which divide my energies and resources amongst them are linked to each other by a system of ideal prices or terms of equivalence. We may conceive of a general 'scale of preferences' or 'relative scale of estimates' on which all objects of desire or pursuit (positive or negative) find their place, and which registers the terms

1—Wicksteed, P. H., *The Common Sense of Political Economy*. Macmillan, London, 1910, p. 32-33.

2—This use of 'satisfaction' might be taken to mean pleasure in the eighth sense. Wicksteed, for all his careful analysis, is ambiguous at times, after the manner of economists and hedonists.

on which they would be accepted as equivalents or preferred one to another." Wicksteed then proceeds to show how even the best of us have certain inconsistencies in our scale of values, so that we might prefer A to B and B to C, but not A to C. "A man might be willing to give a shilling for a knife because he thought it cheap, and might refuse to give a shilling for a certain pamphlet because he thought it dear, and yet if he had been offered the direct choice between the pamphlet and the knife as a present he might have chosen the pamphlet. That is to say, he would prefer the knife to a shilling and would prefer a shilling to the pamphlet, and yet he would prefer the pamphlet to the knife." (p. 33). Wicksteed then points out that these are lapses from reason, and that if we were perfectly intelligent about what we wanted we would not do such things. "The obscure impulses and associations which affect our choice, and interpose themselves between the realities with which we are dealing and our estimate of them, yield in an erratic and irregular manner to the light of reason, lingering here when they have retreated there; and thus inconsistencies of every kind are introduced into our scale. But the greater the range of that scale that is present to our minds at one and the same time, and the more precise our mental estimates, the fewer will be our inconsistencies. The man of alert intelligence and sound judgment will reduce them to a minimum, and the wider and more consistent the range of our consciously realized alternatives is, the more economical will the administration of our resources be.

"A man's actual scale of preferences then may depart to any extent and for any reason from the ideal of wisdom, and may be full of inconsistencies and vacillations. But such as it is, it connects the various objects of his desire by a system of prices, and his successive acts of choice, whether purchases or other selections, are constantly revealing fragments of it, as he determines that at this price he will select this alternative and reject the other."

Wicksteed here uses price in the sense of exchange value or the quantity of anything that is or will be exchanged for a given quantity of something else. Price and preference mutually imply each other. Every sale and barter is a preference. We actively prefer what we get to what we give up. And every preference is an exchange of some sort. We want two things, and by giving up or not taking one we get the other.

All the goods of life beckon us on (I speak metaphorically). We spend ourselves and our resources in pursuing and in enjoying them. In every waking hour we are doing something in preference to something else. We prefer what we are doing, at the time, to other things which we might be doing. If we did not we would quit what we are doing and do some of them. We keep at what interests us most, that is, what has the most value to a present or short range anticipatory interest. No interest holds the center of the stage permanently. As we enact each interest a time comes when the value of its object falls, at least temporarily. The principle of diminishing utility applies almost everywhere. We eventually come to the point where the value of what we are doing or using or pursuing or buying falls below the average minute's worth of our time or dollar's worth of our money or foot-pound's worth of our energy. We thereupon switch over to something else which is more worth while. The essential idea in this is expressed by the economists in their notion

of a margin of consumption,³ which is in substance that dollars are used successively to beat down the marginal utilities of various goods in such a way as to keep the marginal utilities of dollar's worths of all goods about equal. This quantity of utility (it is what I would call secondary value, and what economists sometimes call subjective value), to which the utility of a dollar's worth of everything we buy tends and approximates, marks the margin of consumption. If the utility of a dollar's worth of anything falls below this we stop buying or consuming it until the utility rises again. If the utility rises above this margin we assiduously buy and consume the thing until, in accordance with the law of diminishing utility, its marginal utility has fallen to or below the margin of consumption.

We are continually making choices which measure very accurately our feelings, not toward a friend as a whole, not toward music as a whole, not toward food as a whole, but toward limited quantities of these. It is the present and the short range anticipatory interest in small units of these which are measured in most of our choices. Occasionally, however, a choice will determine the fate of a whole major interest and of the value of its objects extending as far into the future as we can look; and such a choice will accurately measure its strength. The lesser choices which we are continually making give only a rough estimate of the strength of the larger interest. The more time and energy we choose to spend in the company of a friend, or the more often we choose to listen to a particular piece of music, the more, in all probability, do we like these. But indications of this sort may be deceiving. I do not think that the amount of time we spend sleeping is any accurate measure of the degree in which we like it. I doubt if one man will get eight hours a night regularly because he likes it one seventh more than the man who only gets seven hours. Of course the number of hours is partly involuntary, but not wholly so.

The resources which we spend in getting the various goods of life are simply other goods which we possess, and are all commensurable in each man's ideal system of prices in the same manner as are the goods he wants. A man's money is obviously a good, tho only an instrumental one except so far as he inclines to be miserly. His other material wealth is plainly a collection of goods. His time and energy and labor are also goods which can be sold to others who need them or used by himself both instrumentally and in directly valuable forms. Time and energy are accurately commensurable with money. A man ought to know how much money his time is worth. He is foolish if he performs certain labors, which he could hire a man to do while he was making in some other line of work more than enough to pay the man. And he is foolish if he hires a man to do some work when he could do it himself at less cost, i. e., by using time and labor of his own which is worth less than what he is paying the man. Resources are things that we have and that we relinquish in fixed quantities in preferring some fixed quantity of something else to them. In that preference the resource appears on the scale of prices, and its units take their places in relation to all other things that we have feeling-attitudes toward.

3—See Ely, R. T., *Outlines of Economics*. Macmillan, N. Y., 1923. p. 132-133.

Perhaps a Pragmatist or a Behaviorist would contend that these feelings of which I speak are nothing but preferences, since they hardly show up at all in overt behavior except in an act of choice. But the view of the matter for which I am contending is that preference merely constitutes the best kind of evidence to demonstrate the relative strengths of feelings, and that even apart from any preferences the feelings would still exist and have perfectly definite quantitative aspects, and there would be genuine differences between the quantities. To assert that a man values one thing more than another is not meaningless in the absence of conflict between his interests in the two things. An act of preference always means or implies a difference of intensity between two feelings. And a difference of the strengths of two feelings will always mean and imply and determine a preference, if there is conflict. But such a difference means more than merely preference. A man may like one thing better than another without ever performing any act of preference between them or between any part of them. If he thinks of the two together he will realize that he feels more strongly toward one than toward the other. And if then he says, 'I like this better than that', he has given good evidence for this state of his feelings (unless he is a liar). Or if he does not think of the two together, and does not know how he feels toward either except when he is face to face with it, he may still feel toward one more strongly than toward the other, and thus give to one a greater value than to the other without ever knowing about this difference in their values. His feelings, and their respective strengths, are, however evidenced, and even if un-evidenced, facts of his experience, and are not identical with any behavior, implicit, explicit, laryngial, or otherwise. The difference between their strengths is then a fact even if unknown to the man himself or to anybody else.

If this is true of the relations between the values of one man, it would seem also to be true of the relations between the values of different men. And I think that such is the case. I think that all values of different men and perhaps of all animals have definite quantitative relations. And my earlier statement to the effect that it is only those values which belong to one person that are very accurately or significantly commensurable with each other, refers to the two facts that, firstly, as between different people no accuracy whatever is possible in judging what these relations are, and, secondly, that generally there is no use of accurate knowledge as to what they are.

First let us consider the lack of accuracy in comparisons of values as between different people. If the differences are great some comparison is possible. If X shows that he likes A, and Y shows that he dislikes B it is clear that A's value to X is greater than B's value to Y. If X likes A and Y shows a complete indifference to B, it is clear that X's feeling is stronger than Y's, and that A's value to X is greater than B's to Y. And if X likes A and Y likes B, but X devotes much more attention, time, money, energy, or other resources to the process of getting possession of A or to the enjoyment of A, than Y does for the sake of B, then it is very probable that A's value to X is greater than B's value to Y. But if the outward and visible signs of X's interest in A, and of Y's in B, are not markedly different, no exact measure is possible of the difference, if any, in their respective

feelings toward A and B. Nor is it ever possible to tell exactly how much of A would have a value to X just about equivalent to the value of a certain amount of B to Y. And herein we have the crucial distinction between comparing two feelings in two souls, and comparing two feelings in one soul. It is possible to tell very nearly exactly how much of A has a value to X equal to the value to X of a given quantity of B. A quantity of A which is a trifle smaller than the marginal unit of A that X would choose in preference to a given unit of B, has a value to X equal to the value of that unit of B. When units are small, measurements of great accuracy can be made in a case like this. But X-and-Y together cannot make one identical act of preference which will give this measurement. They might if they were partly or wholly identical. But they are not, as I trust we may confidently assume. A's value to X and B's value to Y cannot be judged as to their quantities by any one act of preference. The indication, given to anyone who attends to the matter and cares to pass judgment, of these quantities and of the difference between them, is the degrees of attention and of activity and of time and of other resources devoted respectively to A and B by X and Y. Also what X and Y might say about how much they liked A and B respectively would constitute relevant evidence. But no evidence of this sort can give any accurate notion of the relative strengths of the feelings nor of the values. This type of evidence is relevant also for comparing the strengths of two feelings of one man, and it is no more accurate there than it is when applied to the comparison of feelings between two men. It may be deceiving in any case. A man might feel very strongly about something and not give any proportional indication of it in his overt behavior. Or he might put on a 'scene' and be just acting, either for fun or else for some ulterior purpose.

Bearing upon this matter of guessing the strength of the feeling from the outward behavior of the man, it is pointed out by economists that as between two persons expenditure of equal amounts of money does not indicate that equal utilities are involved. When a poor man spends a dollar it is likely to mean a greater sacrifice than that which the rich man makes when he spends a dollar; and the poor man's dollar probably buys something which has a greater utility to him than the utility of the thing bought by the wealthier person to that person. For the poor man has fewer dollars, and each one probably counts for more in his life. But even this is not a universal rule. If two men each bought a pound of tea and paid the same price, we could not, by comparing the wealth of the two men, compute accurately how strong the feeling of each was in relation to the feeling of the other. We could not say, if one was three times as wealthy as the other, that a pound of tea actually meant a third as much to him as to the other, just because the prices of the two pounds were the same. The poor man might not be so greatly attached either to such money as he had or to the tea that he bought with it, while the rich man might be greatly attached both to his beverages and to every dollar as it came or went or lingered. Every man knows how much he values a dollar at the time that he values it. Other people who judge of how much he values it can only go by overt activities and other attendant circumstances, which, I repeat, may be deceiving. B. M. Anderson correctly interprets the

bearing of these considerations upon his problem of 'social value', when he asserts⁴ that the only measure of value applicable generally and uniformly thruout society is 'price' or exchange value, a very different thing from the secondary value, as well as from the primary value, of which I have treated. He says truly that there is no common measure of feeling magnitude, and means that there is none either of the secondary values relative thereto; tho this would not seem to be a necessary implication of his view that one man can share another's emotional life (p. 125).

The problem of comparison of feelings in two souls is not made easier if one of the parties whose feelings are being compared is the judge. For he will have to judge by behavior alone in order to know what the strength of the other man's feeling is, even tho he can get at his own feeling apart from overt behavior. Thus he can never determine the difference accurately. Unless he is both of the men he can not tell exactly which feeling is the stronger if they are anywhere near equal in strength.

So nobody can tell exactly what relation the magnitudes of two intent-feelings bear to each other if they dwell in two different persons. If they are very different this fact is ascertainable. But if they are nearly the same in intensity there is no way of telling whether they are exactly alike or whether one is a trifle stronger or whether the other is a trifle stronger.

And further it is not important that we should be able to tell exactly. Rough estimates are important at times, and are possible. But what may look like an accurate judgment of this nature is only a balancing of the secondary values of the judge, and need be no more than an accurate balancing of these.

A father may have to choose between getting a foot-ball for one son or a pair of boxing gloves for another. He may want to spend his money where it will do the most good in the family. Then if he can tell that one boy wants the foot-ball more than the other boy wants boxing gloves, he will have a stronger interest in giving the foot-ball to the one than he will in giving the boxing gloves to the other. Whichever way he acts he will act in accordance with his own stronger interest. He never can act voluntarily in any other way. But here his chief interest is to have his preference correspond to or reflect the relative strengths of the respective feelings of the two boys. He cannot make it do this accurately. If there is a great difference in the likings of the two boys it is easy to decide what to do. If one boy wants the ball very much and the other shows an indifference to the gloves, the feeling of the father in favor of the ball becomes stronger and determines the choice, and there is no difficulty at all in making the decision. But if they both want their athletic supplies very much, he can only guess which wants them more, and all that he has to go by is what they do and what they say. And both of these may be deceiving. So he cannot be sure.

But it is not so very necessary that he should be sure. He will make his guess and act accordingly. And if he has fairly good judgment no irremediable evil will be done. Later on he can get something for the boy who lost out this time. All society is enabled to exist by means of such approximate justice as he is able to do. Perfect justice is not possible for man, and we can and do get on without it.

4—Anderson, B. M., *Social Value*, p. 183.

Exact mensuration of other people's feelings, if it were possible, would generally be a work of supererogation in a busy world.

The father may ignore or partly ignore the existing relative strengths of the boys' wishes and decide according to his own interest in what each son should be or do. He may want one boy to be a boxer more than he wants the other to be a foot-ball player. To the extent that considerations like these determine his preference the existing feelings of the boys are irrelevant. But if he is unselfish in this, as he well may be, he is heading the one boy for boxing, and perhaps, tho with less vigor and determination, he is heading the other boy for foot-ball, because he thinks that later on they will genuinely enjoy these things. He is still comparing their feelings but not necessarily any feelings that they are now experiencing. He is trying to gauge what the relative strengths of their feelings will be perhaps ten years hence. This is very difficult, and liable to gross error, but it is not impossible in a rough way. Of course he may judge selfishly and try particularly to make the one boy a boxer and perhaps try also, tho with less determination, to make the other a foot-ball player, simply because his own idea of himself is that he is such a person as would or should have such athletes for sons. And he might buy the gloves in preference to the foot-ball because he would rather be the father of a boxer than the father of a foot-ball player. But whether he is selfish or unselfish, it remains inevitably true that the decision to buy, say, the boxing gloves, is his decision and is immediately determined by whichever feeling in him is the stronger. Whatever he decides is his greatest interest at the time. In this sense a man always decides in accordance with his own greatest interest. And in this sense a man is selfish in every voluntary action. But this is a *Pickwickian* sense of selfishness.

In another kind of situation this problem arises of the quantitative relation between the strengths of the feelings in different souls. A judgment may be passed to the effect that one man enjoys life more than another and that his life is richer and fuller and more worth while on the whole. Generally, of course, when a man, X, says that the kind of life that Y lives is better than the kind of life that Z lives, X is saying that he would rather live as Y does than as Z does. This is merely expressing a preference of his own and is no comparison of the way Y and Z actually feel. It is perhaps an attempt at a comparison of how X thinks he would feel, if he acted as Y does, with how he thinks he would feel if he acted as Z does. But the judgment amounts really to an admission that Y has what X now wants, and that Z has what X does not now want. The feeling in X's soul toward what Y has is stronger than the feeling in X's soul toward what Z has.

But if X is in a more scientific frame of mind, and is not merely expressing envy or contempt, he may mean that Y's life is more valuable to Y than Z's is to Z. And such a judgment might be warranted. If it seems clear that Z has been thwarted in most of his major interests, and that Y has succeeded in expressing most of his with some adequacy, it is fairly safe to conclude that the objects of Y's interests have more value to Y than have the objects of Z's interests to Z, and that there is a greater quantity of positive feeling-tone, whether intent-feeling or non-intent-feeling, in Y's experience than in Z's. But any judgment of this nature is a bit dogmatic. X

has no first hand information as to what Y's and Z's real major interests are. He infers the existence and nature of these interests from the behavior of the men. And such inferences are fallible.

It might be rational for X to wish that he were Y instead of Z. Only if he did he would probably forget that in case the impossible actually happened and he became Y this wish and preference, as expressing X's nature, would vanish when X's nature vanished, and that in becoming Y he would acquire a new scale of preferences, which might even include a preference for being X as over against being Y. It would all depend on the actual state of Y's feelings, which X simply could not know in detail as long as he was X.

II—R. B. Perry's Treatment of Commensurability.

In Chapter 21 of Perry's valuable study⁵ we find the theory put forth that there are three criteria by which values can be compared. These are the standards of intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. Perry denies that any genuine commensurability is possible as between these standards. It is never possible, he says, to get a quantitative comparison of the value of a thing resulting from a certain intensity of interest taken in it, with that resulting from a preference for it, or with that which is due to the multiplication of interests in it. "It appears to be meaningless, ———, to say that what an object loses by a decline in intensity can be offset by a rise in the order of preference. ———only———where there is equality in respect to one dimension, increase in the other dimension yields an increase of the total." (p. 643) And "It is evident that the same condition which precluded the multiplication of intensity and preference will preclude the multiplication of intensity and inclusiveness. ——— We are limited, as in the previous case, to the conclusion that where interests are equally inclusive, the more intense the better; and where they are equally intense, the more inclusive the better." (p. 650) And "———while preference and inclusiveness both measure value, they do not measure it in the same way." (p. 652)

The view which I shall maintain in opposition to all this is that the criterion of intensity is the same as that of preference, and that inclusiveness as he uses it is no measure of value at all. This would imply that there is only one standard of value for each man, and that all of his values are commensurable by that standard. This standard is the strength or intensity of his feelings, and this strength is exhibited in, and is accurately ascertainable from his preferences.

Perry, in his chapter on the Highest Good, immediately following his chapter on Commensurability, seems in one place to admit my contention that all of one man's values are commensurable. He also practically denies it in the same paragraph. But in spite of his ambiguities his statement is significant. He says that, once an integrated and harmonious personality has been achieved, then "relatively to the choice of the person as a whole, all objects—— find a place in one order." (p. 668) This I take to be the actual state of things. And since all of a rational human being's choices

5 —Perry, R. B., *General Theory of Value*. Longmans Green, N. Y., 1926.

do in a sense express his total personality, it follows that all of a man's goods are commensurable.

All of a normal person's choices express his whole personality in the sense of harmonizing with it, and of involving the activity of all relevant parts. When Perry speaks of the 'choice of the person as a whole' I doubt if he means that the whole personality is necessarily active in such a choice. I doubt if any man's whole personality can ever be brought into action at one time. There is too much of it. What I would mean by this phrase, and what I hope and would suppose that he means by it, is that the choice is made by as much of the personality as is likely to be affected by the act resulting from the choice. Interests not affected will play no part in the situation. The choice is not strictly made by the whole personality but it is in harmony with the whole personality. It conforms to a fragment of the one ideal scale of values which the man at that moment has, the portions of that scale may be ignored as irrelevant. Such a choice is simply a rational choice. It is the kind of choice that rational human beings are continually making every day. It is the choice that does not violate any interest unless to express an interest that is stronger. It is a choice which, in enacting one interest, takes into consideration all other interests which are likely to be affected by it, to help them as much as possible, and to hinder them as little as possible. To be making such choices continually is to have an integrated personality.

I do not deny that there may be certain disintegrations in the lives of some people which might preclude the commensurability of certain feelings both of which occurred within one epidermis. This clearly happened in the extreme case of Miss Beauchamp.⁶ As between certain opposed tendencies in her originally unified personality she simply lost the power of preference. Both the contestants became so boisterous when the synthetical function of her brain brought them face to face, that nothing could be done but to keep them apart. This is another way of saying that she had two personalities instead of one. Always keeping feelings apart in two personalities makes them incommensurable whether they are in two bodies or in one. Feelings only get measured when they meet in conflict in one mind.

But such things as befell Miss Beauchamp do not befall most people. There may be genuine temporary dissociations in otherwise normal folks, but they are exceptional. Even where there are inconsistencies in one man's scale of preferences, so that his choices are not rational, they may still be choices made by the man himself. In the illustration which Wicksteed gave of a man who would prefer a knife to a shilling and a shilling to a pamphlet and the pamphlet to the knife, we really have a case where the man's personality changes. This is not an inconsistency in one scale of preferences. It is a case of two different scales occurring at different times. At one time he has one strength of feeling toward a shilling and at another time he has another. Or it may be that his feeling changes toward either or both of the other objects. A man's interests are constantly changing in the intensity which they have when in active operation, and it is still in every case the same man who is

6—Prince, Dr. Morton. *The Dissociation of a Personality*. Longmans Green, N. Y., 1906 (Copyright 1905.)

interested and who exercises the preferences, whether they are rational or irrational (the interests are also constantly varying from this active strength to zero and back again as they pass from the active to the latent form and back again, but this is irrelevant to the ideal scale of preferences). New knowledge is constantly making alterations in each man's system of interests. And this is not the creation of a new dissociated personality. There is still commensurability, i. e., choice, between each new interest and all the rest, some of which are old ones. And when an odd situation makes a temporary irrational alteration the same rule holds. The choice expresses the whole personality of the man as it then is. Thus practically all the choices of normal people, dealing as they do with all their values, conform to that condition which Perry lays down as necessary and sufficient for commensurability.

But in the earlier chapter he teaches a very different doctrine. He treats the conflict of interests like an inhibition of a weaker interest by a stronger. It is as if we were dealing with dissociated personalities, and as if the person, in whose body both the interests had their source, was not both interests; that is, was not interested in the objects of both the interests. If a man is not interested in the object of an interest which is dependent upon his nervous system, then we are dealing with a pathological division of personality and not with the regular thing that is met with in most people's lives. But this, Perry here suggests, is what the conflict of interests means. And he is careful to distinguish this from preference. When a preference is expressed for one thing rather than another there must be, he says, one interest which has both the things as its objects. Preference and the conflict of interests are made two radically different things, each giving a measure of values. And the measure given by one standard, he maintains, is incommensurable with the measure given by the other. "——a conflict of preference, like conflict of interests, is a datum of value." (p. 640.) He means that these are two data of value. My contention is, of course, that these are not two data, but are one datum.

As to the conflict of interests we find that "It might be supposed that when one interest inhibits another, the object of the one has somehow been preferred to the object of the other. But preference implies a preferring interest. What interest, then, has in this case preferred the one object to the other? Not the inhibiting interest, for that is bent exclusively upon its own object; not the inhibited interest, for that is not allowed to manifest itself at all. Nor does inhibition imply an act of preference on the part of the total self. The first interest excludes the second, but there is no preference between the object of the one and the object of the other, such as occurs in personal choice. Inhibition, instead of providing for such choice, renders it impossible by silencing one of the interests which is an indispensable party to its occurrence. If the plaintiff expels the defendant from the court this does not bring a decision but simply prevents a trial." (p. 634)

In the last two sentences here quoted he suggests that preference involves at least two interests in conflict. But this suggestion is not developed. His almost constant assumption is that preference is exercised by one interest only among several objects of that interest. In another place, in the following chapter (p. 667), he speaks of the place of an interest on a preferential scale. This is also at variance

with his assumption, in the chapter on Commensurability, that an interest is what prefers certain of its objects to others. If the interest is itself on the scale it is not that interest which is doing the preferring. If Perry's real meaning is that in preference there are two interests in conflict and that a third single interest exercises a preference between them or between their objects, then he is on the right track but has not made his meaning as clear as he should. The questions may then be asked, Does the third single interest decide according to the strengths of the conflicting interests or is it able to throw its weight into the contest and actually determine the victor itself? Is it really a separate third interest which has an existence and a force of its own apart from the other two? And if so, are their objects its objects? Or are they its objects? Is there an interest in the two particular interests, in every preference? Or are there two interests taken in each object, one the particular interest which has no other object than this one, and the other the third interest which is interested both in this object and in the other? These questions I shall attempt to answer later.

Following the paragraph which I have quoted above in regard to inhibition, Perry goes on to say that it is a fundamental feature of interest that it should exhibit preference among its eligible objects, as well as preference for its eligible objects as over against other objects in the environment with which it is not concerned. There is no suggestion that a preference could represent a conflict of interests, except in the two places I have just noted (on pages 634 and 667), and in some incidental illustrations the implications of which are not developed. In one of these (p. 634) he says that we must choose when a highwayman offers the alternatives of 'your money or your life.' Would he maintain that money and life are both the objects of the same interest, the one more and the other less eligible? If not, his formulations of his theory deny the possibility of any choice in a case like this. If one's interest in his life simply inhibits his interest in his money and throws it bodily out of court and out of mind then it would seem that there is no trial, no weighing of alternatives, and no preference.

What he says about inhibition may be true about inhibition. But then the conflict of interests is generally not a case of inhibition. True he does not say explicitly and in so many words that the conflict of interests is a matter of inhibition. But I do not see how any other interpretation can be put upon his words. If an interest is intense, he says, this means that it inhibits other interests. Its exclusive possession of the organism is what constitutes its intensity. (p. 631) This would certainly seem to indicate that the clash of different interests is conceived after the manner of an inhibition rather than after the manner of a choice. I have already quoted the passages where he says that "——a conflict of preference, like conflict of interest, is a datum of value". (p. 640) Surely he means that they are different data. And he nowhere discusses any third manner, in which the interest or interests in two objects might compete with each other, in addition to the two forms of (1) conflict between two interests involving inhibition, and (2) preference exercised by one interest as between its several objects.

What Perry ignores is that in the conflict of a man's interests the man himself is all his interests. He himself is interested in all the objects of interests whose source is in his nervous system, barring

pathological dissociation. Perry treats the conflict of interests as if it never occurred except in cases of divided personality. But on the contrary it is one of the most frequent phenomena of the daily life of normal people. Every choice involves a conflict of interests and every conflict of interests in one soul produces a choice, which measures their intensity. The conflict is not generally a mere inhibition. It is no mere forcible eviction of the weaker party before the trial begins. It is in a sense the forcible eviction of the weaker party after the trial is over. The trial is where the two contestants meet and where their relative strengths are determined; and thus where it is decided which one is the weaker and must submit to eviction. The man who judges is both the parties to the suit. He is interested in both the objects. And he cannot have them both. Then he will take the one that he wants the most. He will take the one in which he has the strongest interest, or toward which he has the strongest intent-feeling. I think that Perry is right in saying that if there were merely one interest in X and another interest in Y, and no interest which had them both as its objects, then even if both interests had one nervous system as their physical basis, there would be no choice. I think that choice as between two objects does imply a unitary interest in them. But this unitary interest which gives choice in the conflict of two interests is not something, apart from the two, which descends upon them from above. It is made up of the integration of the two. If there are two interests with one soul or personality as their source, there is choice when they conflict. For to say that they arise in one soul is to say that one self is interested in both of their objects. And this is to affirm that unity of interest in the two objects which is necessary for there being a choice between them. The mere fact that it is one person who is interested in both X and Y means that there is a supervening unity of interest generated out of the two particular interests. It might perhaps be called a higher level interest created in the union of the two. Any two interests which one person feels together, are, by the very fact of their being felt together by one person, integrated; and there is a single interest which emerges out of them. This unity is expressed by the true proposition that one person is interested in both the objects. The continuing duality of the more particular interests is expressed by the true proposition that both of the objects are objects of the interests of one person. Any two interests, then, which conflict in one soul, are, at the same time, both two interests and one interest. It seems to me very remarkable that this should be so. But it also seems to me undeniable. If it were not so,—if it were not for the synthetical unity of apperception and of feeling, operating in every soul, that makes two interests one and also leaves them two, and thus makes choice possible,—the species would not have survived, and there would be nobody to wonder at the marvel, and no marvel to be wondered at. So I exercise my natural piety and doff my hat to the Darwinian Theory as modified by the more recent discoveries of Weismann, De Vries and others.

It is not really possible to define what constitutes a single interest in any final way. Give any interest the number one, and it may, nay it will, unless it is a man's whole personality, turn out to be also some fraction, which cannot however be stated with mathematical accuracy. If a man has an interest in phonograph records I

suppose that Perry would regard this as one interest, and would regard the various records that the man likes as various objects of this interest. Perry would, I think, say that these were objects which could be arranged upon a scale of preference. The man would certainly prefer certain ones to others and would have in mind some idea of the order in which probably quite a number of records stood in his estimation. This would be the order of their values to him. But in a case like this it seems to me futile to deny that he has an interest in each record, which is not wholly identical with his interest in any other record. He has a certain interest in a certain record. An interest in any other record is another interest which has its source in the same soul that is the source of the first one. If he prefers record X to record Y then his feeling toward X is stronger than his feeling toward Y. There are two feelings with different strengths. And there is one feeling that emerges from the two and in a sense includes them both. There is an interest in these phonograph records. That is, the same self likes them both. And all his particular interests in phonograph records make up a unitary interest. All the records are its object, and it has them on a scale of preference. They are all eligible objects and it selects among them. It selects according to the strengths of the particular interests. The strengths of these particular interests are in a measure conditioned and determined by each other and by all the other interests that the man has or is. The place of an interest in the whole system is partly determined by its strength. But its strength is partly determined by its place in the system. Changing valuations in one phase of a man's life may by themselves produce changing valuations in another phase.

There can be a unitary interest with a number of objects arranged on a scale of preference even when these objects are very dissimilar, and are not ordinarily grouped into one class like that of phonograph records. If you choose between your money or your life that implies, I think, that there is one interest which embraces both the interests which have them as their objects. These two interests form a higher unity of interest in the same way that two interests in phonograph records do. And the choice here is just as much a matter of the relative strengths of the two interests as it was there. In fact all the interests of a man's personality integrate to form his personality, which is one interest, and is on the highest level possible. This is not an interest in his personality. It is not an interest which has his personality as its object. It is properly called his personality interest or just his personality. Its object is all the objects of his subordinate interests. To say that the same man is interested in all of the objects of all of the interests which arise in one nervous system is to say that they all form one integrated soul or personality. To say that certain interests all have one soul for their source is to say that one identical man or self is identical with all of them. It is he who is interested in the objects of all of them. He is all of them. He, as they, is interested in all their objects.

It is this fact and this fact alone which gives that accurate commensurability which is found as between the interests of one man. When a physical quantity of one good will be preferred to a fixed physical quantity of another, whereas a slightly smaller amount of the first will be rejected in favor of the other, then the feeling of the man in favor of the other is equal to his feeling for a quantity

of the first which is in between the two quantities of it mentioned. And the degree of accuracy in this measurement is determined by the amount of difference between these two quantities. It may be very small. Perhaps it can never be zero. But no measurements, even of the lengths of physical objects, can be made with perfect accuracy either. There is always a certain margin of possible error which cannot in any way be eliminated. The exact length of a bar of iron can never be discovered. But we can get very close; and so with the measurement of the strengths of feelings.

Perry's two standards, then, of intensity and preference, turn out to be only one standard, which is applicable to all the interests of one personality, but cannot be used in the comparison of feelings dwelling in two personalities, whether these dwell in one body or two.

His standard of inclusiveness is no measure of value at all. He says that "while preference and inclusiveness both measure value, they do not measure it in the same way. Increase, in the sense of inclusiveness, does not imply increase in the order of preference." (p. 652) He is right that they do not measure it in the same way. Greater inclusiveness does not mean preference or a stronger feeling for one thing than for another. His basic fallacy is shown in his assertion that "The object which James and John both like is better than the object which either or both dislike, because the latter contains no more good than the former and some evil." (p. 646) But really it is not better. It does not necessarily have any more value to either James or John on account of its having value to the other. It has more values, of course. But this is very different from having more value or being better. If James and John both like it it has two values. These are not accurately commensurable with each other. And they cannot be added together in any significant sense. If James valued X because it was sweet, and also valued it because it was prettily colored, then he would have two interests in X, one on account of one aspect of it, and another on account of another aspect of it, and this would mean that X was better than if he had only one of these interests in it. If James likes things that are sweet and pretty, then X is better for James on account of its being both sweet and pretty, than it would be for him if it were only either sweet or pretty but not both. His two interests can be added together significantly to make one stronger interest because they both dwell in one soul. But if two feelings dwell in two souls they cannot be significantly added so as to make their object better. 'Better' means that one feeling is stronger than another. The two feelings in James and John cannot be added so as to make one feeling which is stronger than either of these feelings taken alone. If men's souls flowed together they might be so added. But really they do not flow together.

Again Perry says, "—given objects of equal beauty, the more that enjoy them the better." (p. 651) But I ask, better for whom? If ten people are now enjoying them, whereas only one did before, then it is better by nine different standards of preference-intensity, and not by one standard of inclusiveness. For each one who can enjoy the objects of beauty, it is better, other things being equal, to enjoy them than not to enjoy them. And if he likes to have the others join him then it is better for him if they do. But if they bother him, the more who enjoy the objects of beauty, the worse is the situation for him.

In general, of course, it is true that the more who can enjoy a good the better. But that is because people are normally socially inclined and benevolent. It is better for you and for me and for the next man because you and I and the next man prefer that more people should be happy, especially if it is with our kind of happiness. Unless he threatens us, or has injured or insulted us, we love our fellow man, partly because of certain instinctive factors in our natures, and partly because we have been taught that we should do so. To anyone who loves his fellow man, it is better that his fellow man should be happy. But to anyone who hates him it is worse. It all depends upon the point of view. The happiness of others, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the greatest happiness of all, have in themselves no claim upon the favorable interests of anybody who is not interested in them or who is actively opposed to them. They are genuinely good to certain persons who desire that they should be realized; this goodness is due to the existence of these desires. They are the summum bonum to anybody who desires everything else that he may desire only as a means to them. But to normal people they are not the summum bonum.

There is one sense in which the multiplication of interests belonging to different people in one object does increase its value. When all the men wore high silk hats to business, many a business man valued this type of head gear more than he does now. Other people's interests may make something the style and then an individual will value it more, and thus it will have more value, to him, than if others were uninterested in it. By a sympathetic social contagion we are often brought to care for things to which we would have been indifferent in the absence of certain social stimuli. But this is different from saying that the mere multiplication of interests in one thing as such makes the thing more valuable.

Perry also applies his standard of inclusiveness to the mere multiplication of interests of different people in different objects. If Jeremy likes pushpin and James likes poetry, Perry would say that pushpin-and-poetry are better than either pushpin or poetry. The two together constitute a more inclusive aggregate of goods. And he calls this 'better' than a less inclusive aggregate. But this is a misuse of the word 'better'. By this principle the more people in the universe the better, so long as they are all reasonably happy. But whenever anyone says that it would be better if the population were increased he is saying no other than that he wants it to be so. That there should be an increase in population is sometimes a rational ideal. Great nations and large cities have certain advantages. Life in America is now better for the white population than it was three hundred years ago, and partly because we are more numerous. Famine and various enemies are less menacing. But a great number of people, as such, is no good. If crowding is pushed too far a genuine mutilation results for which mere magnitude as such does not in the least compensate. There is a certain population which would best serve the interests of the average citizen. And the average citizen ought to desire that that number should be reached and held and not exceeded. To desire that there should be great numbers of people, except as a means to some ulterior national purpose, is folly. But Perry's standard of inclusiveness implies that such a desire is rational, as being aimed at that which is naturally 'better' or perhaps even 'best'.

In this discussion of inclusiveness and in the following and final chapter on the Highest Good, Perry gets to speaking of good and evil as if they really belonged intrinsically to the objects which actually only borrow them. He seems to forget that value is a function of interest. He seems to forget that good and bad are meaningless unless you can specify for whom. He thinks, for instance, that it would not be just right to buy the eternal happiness of millions of people at the price of the eternal torture of one lost soul (p. 670-672), and that even if he himself, Perry, felt callous about that forlorn one, still his feelings would have nothing to do with the rights or wrongs of the case. "The evil of the lost soul is pure, stark, unmitigated, and unrelieved." (p. 672) But for whom? Simply for the lost soul and those who may sympathize with him. For anyone who does not sympathize it is no evil at all. The sorrows of the ants that we trample thoughtlessly under foot do not trouble our dreams or our consciences. Probably this is because we never catch the anguished look upon their faces as they die. There probably is no anguished look there to catch. Our trappings are a pure, stark and unmitigated evil to the ants, but not to us. Millions of men (all mankind) do buy their happiness (such as it is) at the cost of what are unmitigated evils to such living things as mosquitoes, cockroaches, rats, bed-bugs, rattle-snakes, deadly disease germs, etc., who must die that we may live. None of these pests meant to be pests. They just awoke to life with the natures which Nature gave them. Innocent of malice, it was their destiny to pester us, and often to fall before our superior power, in order that we might be comfortable. And so perhaps with the lost soul. But not necessarily. It all depends upon the feelings and sympathies of the one, whoever he might be, who was to decide whether the millions should be happy at the expense of the one, or whether some other disposition of the case should be made.

Again, Perry lays it down without qualification that the fulfillment of two interests is better than the fulfillment of only one or neither of them. By the standard of inclusiveness I suppose it is so. But would it have been better if in 1914-1918 the Germans had fulfilled both their interest in sinking the British fleet and their interest in overwhelming the Allied armies in France, rather than doing only one, or neither of these? The question immediately arises, better for whom? Not better for the Allies, surely. Perhaps not better for the great mass of humanity. Better for the military class in Germany, yes. But who sympathizes with them now? It is not profitable to discuss what would be better and what would be worse unless we specify for whom. And when we specify 'for whom' we are judging, not by any standard of inclusiveness, but by the standard of preference-intensity.

CHAPTER IV.

FEELING AS THE BASIS OF DUTY.

The theory that feeling, and particularly intent-feeling, is the value fundamental, has certain implications in regard to duty and moral obligation.

The terms duty, obligation, and 'ought,' have two rather different meanings. In the first they mean just interest or desire. In the second they apply to an instrumentality in the service of an interest. The first is categorical and the second is hypothetical.

As an illustration of the first, we sometimes say that, while we ourselves may not care about doing something, nevertheless if another man wants to he ought to. We would say this perhaps in the case where he was being influenced by our social example to refrain from doing what would have no evil consequences to us if done by him. If the consequences of an act can be safely ignored, then the urgency of someone's interest in doing it constitutes a categorical imperative, dictated by feeling rather than by reason. This use of the word 'ought' expresses the combination of the original innocence with the continual and insistent push and drive of any impulse. The original innocence, inherent in all impulses and interests, is only lost when they obstruct, either in themselves or by their consequences, some other interest. The push is always there. Each impulse by itself claims to be absolute and asserts its imperative categorically. But every interest that is a subordinate interest in an integrated personality, that is, one which dwells in the same soul with other interests whose "I" is the same as its, will, under some conditions of conflict with them, yield more or less gracefully, and acknowledge its limitations. When such deference is uncalled for we are dealing with a categorical imperative, not of reason, but of feeling. A man's total unified personality (if he has one) is of course such an imperative.

This kind of 'ought' is not very important except as applied to the whole personality. There is almost always conflict within the soul. Consequences can seldom be ignored or wholly approved. But there are occasions when it is true that, to assert that a man wants to do something, is the equivalent of asserting that he ought to do it.¹

The hypothetical imperative is what we deal with chiefly when we speak of men's duties and obligations. A man ought to do anything which is a comparatively effective means to an ultimate end or to ultimate ends which he predominantly desires. If a man wants to keep thin and can do so by regular exercise, he ought to exercise

1—I am indebted to Professor E. B. McGilvary of the University of Wisconsin for this notion of a categorical imperative of feeling. I am not sure that he would wholly approve of my formulation of it.

regularly. If he does not care how fat he is, and if he does not care about the consequences of obesity, he need not exercise. The ultimate goal of his desire is the condition of the obligation. Given that goal as an actual end of his endeavor, the obligation is binding. If a man wants the approval of society he ought to conform to the standards which it requires. If he does not care about the approval he need not. Of course all normal men do care about the approval of some people, so there is always an obligation for the normal to live up to some standard.

Thus all obligation, categorical and hypothetical, is a matter of the feelings of the individual himself.

It is nevertheless true that some moral principles are nearly universal. The explanation of their near-universality is three-fold. The first two of the reasons are very closely related, but I think that they call for separate emphasis. The first is that there is much similarity in the basic feelings of all men, due to a common heredity. Our interests are in some cases congenitally similar. This makes men of different nations and tribes, which may never have heard of each other, behave somewhat in the same manner, and desire the same kinds of things. And in this connection one of the most important things that all normal men desire is the approval of certain other people who constitute their group. And this desire is one of the chief factors in producing social pressure, which is the second explanation of the similarity of men's feelings on some subjects. The approval of our fellows is largely secured by a process of living up to the standards which they set up. Within any group there are certain rules and requirements which every member has to take account of, and in a measure conform to and uphold, and which each one generally comes to believe in and to wish to uphold. These standards, which most of the citizens are anxious to preserve, are imposed upon any individuals who may be unwilling, and much uniformity is achieved.

Were it not for these two factors of congenital similarity of interest, and social pressure, men would not have cooperated sufficiently to survive. Thus it is the principle of natural selection that in large measure explains the uniformity of human morals.

The third factor making for this uniformity is the similarity of conditions within all groups. For instance, every group needs leadership, and every group needs loyalty, and every group demands that its members shall cooperate. Men with similar natures, reacting to similar conditions, generally feel similarly.

But, as I have suggested, this widespread similarity of feeling and of ethical precept is not quite universal. Due to variations in training, or to ordinary quarrels, or to a fluke in heredity, there are occasionally people, and also whole nations of people, whose interests vary considerably from those of the generality of mankind or from those of other nations. And with everybody there are certain individual differences, more in some cases and less in others. All these differences of interest are responsible for conflicts of ideals, some of which are serious and can only be settled by force. Social cooperation between the two individuals or groups may break down completely or nearly completely. Most or all of what is good for one is then bad for the other and vice-versa. Cooperation, however, will seldom break down entirely. Enemies may agree as to treatment of non-combatants or as to care of the wounded on the battle-field, and

two competitors may agree to treat each other in a gentlemanly fashion when they meet socially. Almost all men who are enemies have also certain agreements. And almost any two people who co-operate will also in a measure clash. Nobody is exactly like anybody else and nobody is wholly different from anybody else. But we are nearly all so much alike in certain fundamentals that some moral rules are binding almost universally.

Let us first consider the matter of obligation in the field of art. The assertion that some art is of a higher order than other art amounts to the assertion that there is a certain obligation to cultivate the higher in preference to the lower. This assertion seems to imply that the higher is better than the lower apart from any considerations of the strength of the interests taken in them. If higher and lower have any meaning here, a man who cultivates jazz in preference to so-called good music, because he likes jazz better, ought really to cultivate the good music instead because it has more value. And then what has become of our contention that the quantity of value that a thing has depends upon the strength of the feeling-attitude directed toward it? The problem here presented cannot be answered in a sentence. It is generally true that the interest in so-called good music is higher, and that the interest in jazz is lower. But this higher and lower, with their implication of greater and less value, is only significant in relation to a certain state of a man's interests or to a capacity which he may have to develop into this state. In relation to any other state of his interests, or in case of his incapacity to develop this state, so-called good music does not have a greater value than jazz, and is not in any proper sense of the word 'higher'. It might be better for the man who actually prefers jazz to cultivate better music. But it might not. It depends upon his nature and the capacities of his nature. It depends upon his ability to develop a genuine liking for good music. If he does not like so-called good music, but if he could enjoy it by spending some time in listening to it and studying it, and if he is interested in enriching his life with added enjoyable elements, and if cultivating an interest in it will not interfere with other matters which are ultimately more important, then he ought to cultivate the interest, and good music is better and higher for him. But if study would not enable him genuinely to enjoy it, or if he does not care about enriching his life, or if trying to enrich it in this way would obstruct other interests which are stronger than his ultimate interest in good music would be, then he ought not to and it is not higher for him. In other words he ought to if it is to his interest in the long run to do so, and he ought not to if it is not to his interest in the long run.

Good music is higher and better than jazz because it satisfies more fully. It expresses more of one's personality. We like it more. And where for any man it does not satisfy more fully, and expresses less of his personality, because he does not understand it or perhaps has not that aspect of personality which it expresses, and where a man does not and will never like it as much as he likes jazz, then for him it is not better nor higher than jazz. Higher and lower, better and worse, do not dwell in any objects of interest independently of these interests. But 'higher' does properly qualify what we call good music. It does not do so universally. It does so only in relation to most people. This means that good music does express, in artistic

form, interests in most human hearts that are deep and strong.

If a parent is dealing with the education of his son the case is somewhat different from that which is presented to a mature man guiding his own life. It is legitimate, for a man who wishes his son well, to try to cultivate in the boy an appreciation of good music, provided the child will eventually enjoy it, and provided that greater interests are not sacrificed. Here it is not always a necessary condition that the boy should have an interest in enriching his own life. If he does not in the least like to practice his music or study about it, and if he does not want to add to his capacity for enjoyment along this line, it may still be legitimate for the parent to insist upon his continuing with it. In thus insisting the parent is certainly doing an injury to the boy at the time. He is partly spoiling the youngster's joy in life, and there is no compensation to any interest which is actively functioning in the boy's nature. But when the boy grows up he may enjoy the music. The injury which the father does to the boy when young may be instrumental in producing a more than compensatory good later on for the man whose self will have grown out of, and be partly identical with, the self of the boy. The future good will more than compensate if the grown man then feels that it does. His then past sufferings will hurt him then, and his then present enjoyments will delight him then. And he will then know whether the good that was achieved was worth the price, to him. A parent who wishes to have his son still love him ten, twenty, thirty years hence, must be careful in imposing this, as in imposing other forms of drudgery. The discipline of this ungrateful study must not be pushed too far. And it is always a delicate question where to stop. It must stop when it is clear that the boy will not develop a mature interest in music, and it must stop when it makes him too unhappy in the present. But some degree of this type of injury to an existing personality is justified by its often being instrumentally valuable from the point of view of what that personality will become ten years hence. Without the imposition of some drudgery whose meaning is not fully grasped by the child, most children would grow up utter barbarians and would probably be unhappy themselves. They would become unadjusted to civilized society, and would be great nuisances to other people. Drudgery wisely imposed is bad for the child but good for the man whom the child will become. The parent probably is and should be more interested in the success of the ultimate interests of the future man whom his son will become, than in the immediate welfare of the boy. Where the two conflict he should, and generally will, prefer the former. The gratitude of the grown man will be worth more to him, if he is normal, than the gratitude of the boy.

The dangers that the parent runs in tinkering, as he almost must, with his son's personality, are that he may make a bad mistake in forecasting the grown man's interests which he is trying to provide for, and that the discipline which he imposes may make the boy so unhappy as a boy that other evils will result in later life. If a parent does either of these things he is doing a great wrong, and is guilty of an utterly unjustifiable parental tyranny. But when he avoids these dangers he is providing for the higher interests of the man to be. The good music whose structure the boy is taught in a measure to understand, is a higher, that is, a greater, good, not to the boy, but to the man who will grow out of the boy, and also to

the father who cares about the man who will grow out of the boy. Higher and lower make a valid distinction when applied to interests and values and pleasures, but they never escape from their relativity to the state of somebody's interests either as those interests are, or as they will be. There is no obligation upon anybody to do anything which it is contrary to his own ultimate interest to do.

It seems easier to recognize the relativity of aesthetic than of moral obligation. People feel some difficulty in justifying all virtue by feeling. In morals it seems that actual conformity to a standard is demanded even if the party does not want to conform. A man who commits a crime is not forgiven when he pleads that it was to his own long-run interest to commit it. Can we say that a man whose interests run counter to those of the majority of decent law-abiding citizens is right in violating the moral rules which those people have adopted to express and to protect their interests? I think that we must admit that, if he really wants to do what he does, and is willing to take the consequences of his acts, he is right from his own point of view. Right and wrong is always relative to some one point of view. It may be right from his point of view and wrong from some other. He may have an obligation to do what is a genuine wrong to others and what these others have an obligation to try to prevent him from doing. A man ought to commit bigamy, murder, forgery, and arson, if he wants to, and if he wants, or is indifferent to, the probable consequences of his acts; in other words, he ought to if it is to his interest in the long run. Doing what is in accord with one's interest in the long run is what living a rational life consists in. But if the criminal is living what is for him a rational life (as he may be; I do not say that he is; I say that it is possible that he should be; it all depends upon the actual state of his feelings) it does not follow that other people should stand idly by and commend his rationality. All the decent people in society have an interest in preventing and in suppressing crime. In the long run it is to their interest that such acts as the criminal performs, however rational they may be for him who does them, should be stopped. It may be rational for a mosquito to bite a man. At least it is not irrational. If she had self-consciousness (I believe it is only the ladies that bite us) and acted deliberately according to the nature which she has, and which now she fulfills, doubtless rather blindly, she would still poison us, tho perhaps more circumspectly and with less danger to herself. Reason in an animal which was congenitally hostile to man would only make it more hostile. Rationality would not bring it into harmony with our interests. What is rational for any animal is a matter which is relative to its own instincts and interests. Because of the structure of the mosquito's body and because of the nature of her instincts, and because of the nature of man's skin and blood, her interests and ours are opposed. We meet each other only to poison and to crush.² We do not hesitate to kill a biting insect, merely because it is honestly fulfilling its naturally appointed function nor because it does not mean to do any harm and does not know that it is doing any harm. And we do not hesitate, merely because a criminal in committing a crime may have been acting according to his nature and his true interest, to punish him. He was acting

2—I am here using an illustration from Santayana, G., *Reason in Science*, p. 223.

contrary to our interest, and that is enough. We must deal with any hostile nature, animal, vegetable, or mineral, so as to prevent it from destroying us. We are obliged to do this if we want to continue to live and enact our various interests; and we almost always do want to do so. The dominant people in any society want to do so, or if not they do not long remain dominant.

If the criminal was sincere and rational in his act and was willing to take the consequences of his crime, then it is clear that he prefers crime-plus-punishment taken together, to neither. Then in getting the punishment he is getting an integral part (that part which itself has the most direct objective unpleasantness) of a whole that he prefers. He has doubtless a direct negative interest in the punishment. But his instrumental interest in it is positive. In order to commit the crime he has to take it also. And this positive instrumental interest is stronger than the negative direct interest in it. Otherwise he would not have chosen it. So in a sense he is getting what he wants when he is electrocuted. Of course, after the crime he may feel that his act was not worth the punishment. He will then regret his deed, and will admit to himself that he made a mistake. He acted foolishly. He injured his own more permanent interest thru not knowing what it was or would be, or thru ignoring it in a moment of passion. Then the crime was wrong from his own point of view. He ought not to have done it. He violated his own major interest. And this is probably what most criminals admit to themselves when they get caught. Their acts are generally quite wrong from their own point of view. Perhaps they are always so. This is a question of fact which I cannot settle. I am simply contending that if the criminal's actual feelings were in a certain state, in which they might conceivably be, his act would be right from his point of view.

The police, the courts, and the penal institutions are maintained at great expense to keep crime in check. The methods which they can use are confinement or other bodily punishment, re-education, and execution. The second is not used much and perhaps cannot be used much. Mature people cannot very easily make a complete change in their habits. A man who is trained for one line of work can switch over to an entirely different line only with great difficulty. It is as hard to go from sea-faring to the legal profession, or vice-versa, as it is to turn from a career of crime to one of plodding daily labor, or vice-versa. If reformatories do very little reforming it is not to be wondered at.

But bodily confinement and execution are things which the publicly constituted authorities can inflict upon a criminal pretty effectively if they can catch him. The former of these will prevent him from doing any harm at least during the period of his sentence, and the possibility of this will constitute something of a threat to him and to others, which will at times act as more or less of a deterrent. Execution is both a threat to the incipient criminal and an effective way of putting an end to a career of crime.

In all dealings with criminals the basic thing which should be kept in mind is the need of diminishing crime. This need is the only justification there is for the expenses involved in supporting the police and the prisons and the judges. It is infantile to take as ultimate such current notions as those of an abstract justice, or of retribution, or of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Retri-

bution may often be justified as a means to prevention. But it is not the final controlling principle. Anger and the lust for revenge are some of the instinctive things provided by evolution for a man's protection. If an animal does not attack when he is attacked he may be eaten. If his enemy gets off unscathed he may attack again. If we do not destroy or injure those who threaten or injure us, we may slip over into the category of those unfit to survive, which is much less fun than ranking with the fit. But it must be admitted that pugnacity and resentment are only very roughly adapted to securing the protection of the man who experiences them. They will often get him into danger which a person of milder propensities would have avoided. In the *primaeval* forest they were an awkward makeshift, tho they did serve their purpose after a fashion, as our presence here, with them as part of our biological inheritance, testifies. In the Great Society they are quite inadequate. They do not sufficiently protect. Instinctive resentment is not the principle which those social institutions which are organized for our protection should aim to follow. This instinct is indeed one interest which has a certain place in a rational life. It may properly be given a certain limited expression. But it is only one interest among a great many. And it tends to demand more sacrifice than it is worth. It is very likely, when uncurbed, to spoil many things whose value in the long run is greater than is the value of its completely successful expression.

The one ultimate guiding principle which should be followed, in all dealings with crime, is that crime should be abolished or diminished in the interest of the protection of the law-abiding citizens. Their feelings of resentment should be largely ignored except so far as these are likely to lead to acts of violence on their part, which, again, it is to everybody else's interest to prevent. Putting a murderer in jail is partly justified by the fact that it prevents the family of the victim from taking private vengeance and thus causing still more disorder and perhaps starting a feud. It prevents private vengeance partly by putting the murderer where it is hard to get at him, and partly by satisfying, in a measure, the feeling of vengeance, felt by the family of the victim, thru the punishment which it inflicts.

It is a fundamental principle in morals and criminology that it is never rational for anybody to punish anybody else unless the punishment is for the advantage of the man who does the punishing. Tho a criminal has done the vilest deed imaginable, if it is to nobody's interest and advantage to punish him, anybody who punishes him is a fool. The rule is, that, if they are able, people ought to punish other people (as they ought to do anything else) only if it is to their interest to do so.

In the matter of punishment it is very important to determine who is to blame. If a wrong has been done and a man is not to blame for it, it will do no good to his punishers to punish him. Punishment will not tend to prevent him from breaking the rules again. He has not shown any inclination to break the rules at all. Jailing him will rather tend to make a criminal of him, which will be bad for the society in which he lives. But if he did the deed intentionally, or if he did an act intending the crime to result from it, or if he did an act carelessly, the natural and probable consequences, or (as the lawyers say) the proximate consequences, of which, were the wrong which was done, then he is to blame. (The exact meaning of 'prox-

imate' is not clear in the decisions. Its precise definition would determine exactly how careless a man would be permitted to be as to the consequences of his act, and still not be held responsible for them. This cannot be exactly defined.) If he is to blame, then those authorized should punish him, largely for the sake of preventing him from deliberately willing such a crime again, or from being again so careless as to let it happen.

In the case of moral blame for acts not amounting to criminal offences, and where the penalty is the disapproval of the the act felt and expressed by certain persons or perhaps by the whole community, we are dealing with instinctive resentment felt by a group against one who violates the rules which it has established for its protection and welfare. Moral praise and blame, as Westermarck said, are only gratitude and grudge. They are the honoring of those who support the principles which we regard as helpful to our long-run social interests, and the condemning of those who have violated these principles.

If we are correct in basing moral acts and moral judgments upon feeling, it follows that the widely held doctrine, that a man is never under obligation to do what he is unable to do, is false. This theory treats duty as if it were always imposed upon a man from above by a superior person who stood ready to punish in case the man disobeyed. A person in authority would be foolish and unjust to punish a man for not doing what he could not do. It would be scandalous if a man were punished by any living being, God or man, for the non-performance of the impossible. If he were so punished he could still say, 'there was no need of my trying to obey'. One chief function of punishment is to change the will of the victim. His omitting to obey in this case was not an aberration of his will.

The case of a man who will be punished if he fails to do something may be an illustration of duty, but it is not a good illustration to exhibit the generic nature of it. In such a case it may not be a man's duty to obey, and there are cases of duty where no superior person is attempting to direct an inferior. A man is under obligation to obey a master if he wants directly to help the master, or if his interest in serving is only instrumental, that is, if he simply wants to avoid the punishment which the master will inflict in case he disobeys. Obeying is a means to an end in which he is interested. If a man does not want to help the master and does not mind such punishment as the master is able to inflict, he is under no obligation whatever to obey.

A man may, then, have an obligation to do what he is unable to do. If he wants to support his family he must hold his job and keep his health. But perhaps he cannot. The obligation remains while his interest in supporting his family remains. If a criminal wants to avoid going to jail and wants the approval of the more respectable section of society, he too must get into some steady work and stay with it. But perhaps he cannot. The obligation is temporally co-extensive with the interest.

If a man has failed to do his duty we generally blame him. If he does his duty we generally approve, or, if it was in the face of difficulties, we applaud. But there is no necessary connection between moral praise and blame by others and the doing and not doing of one's duty. We condemn the man who, thru a dissolute manner of life, fails to provide for those dependent upon him. He has neglected a

duty. This neglect of duty is a matter of the relation of his dissolute behavior to his ultimate interest in his family and in their welfare and in their affection for him. He is interested in these things, and his dissolute life, instead of being a means to the satisfaction of his interests, is a real obstruction. We blame him probably on several scores. We sympathize with the family, that is, we are actually interested in its welfare and are pained at its suffering. We blame him as the cause of this thwarting of our interest in its welfare. And if, in society generally, men neglect their duties, that is not so good for all of us. Our lives and happiness often depend upon other people's doing their duties. We are, then, in general, desirous that anybody who belongs to our society should do his duty. When the man in question neglects his duty he thwarts our interest, and we resentfully condemn him.

The deeds and fortunes and interests of other people are frequently matters of intense interest to us. And what may superficially appear to be a cold and abstractly rational judgment of moral praise or blame is actually the expression of a deep feeling of gratitude or resentment. If we were not interested we would not pass the judgment.

The tendency which many people have to cling to notions of absolute duty, and absolute good and bad in morals, displays a laudable interest in maintaining standards of decency in social intercourse. But this tendency is pernicious from the purely theoretical point of view. And I doubt whether morality will decline when people in general are taught the awesome truth that virtue is founded on their own long run interests. One of the troubles with ethical theory and with moral teaching in the past has been the failure to recognize the existence of men's long run interests, which are actual positive intent-feelings that have as their objects the social order, the man's own community, his future career and reputation, his own health, and the welfare of his family. When one speaks of interest the traditional moralist thinks of immediate interests and selfish interests. But there are other interests than these. When a man performs the drudgery necessary to fight his way to success in any line of work, or when he does any duty in the face of great obstacles, the traditional moralist thinks that he does not like what he is doing. But the man is actually enacting a major interest. He does what he does because, on the whole, he likes it. The directly unpleasant factors in it he likes instrumentally. He does them voluntarily, and every voluntary act is dictated by some interest and is itself or is a pursuit of, his own pleasure, in the eighth sense of that word.

Even in self-sacrifice, and even when self-sacrifice involves giving up one's own life, the act is the enactment of an interest, and, as John Hill Burton said, it is "the pursuit of pleasure—the doing of that which it pleases a man to do—the doing that which volition suggests." Men who have died voluntarily are no exception to the rule in regard to all voluntary action. If a man prefers to die rather than live in disgrace, or rather than anything else, then his positive feeling-attitude toward his own death in the very near future is shown to be stronger than his positive feeling-attitude toward his-life-and-the-disgrace. He does what he likes the best. He can do nothing else voluntarily. The pleasure-pains, which determine the values of the alternatives, and determine the choice, are feelings which actually exist in his soul at the moment of choice.

No other feelings than those which are actually present (I do not mean here merely the feelings whose objects are present, which constitute what I call 'present interests') can determine a choice directly, or create actual values. Past and future feelings did and will create values. They do not do so now. All the values that things have are due to actually existing interests whose sources are in the present.³ The objects of these interests may be past, present or future. What I call retrospective, present, and anticipatory interests have, when actually existing and giving value to their objects, a source which is in the present. So the fact that an anticipatory interest has for its object the cutting off in the near future of all further experiences and interests of the self which is the source of the interest, is not contradictory. This anticipatory interest, taken in this object, is not one of the future interests the cutting off of which is the object. This interest is not concerned with cutting itself off. It now exists but it will find its natural consummation and will naturally and resignedly cease in the moment of death. There is no interest in extending it beyond that moment.

Failure to realize that it is a man's own long range interests which determine his duties vitiates the conclusion drawn by Pepper in his very interesting study of the ethical theories of Santayana and Bosanquet.⁴ Pepper makes a complete duality between immediate values, which are felt, and which the Epicureans talked about; and moral standards, which are not felt, and which the Kantians have philosophized about. He asserts that Santayana fails to get these two things together (p. 108), and further that there is no way of getting them together (p. 107, 108, 118). I shall contend, on the contrary, that, as I have argued, moral standards arise from feelings which are immediately given in experience, and also, that Santayana expresses substantially the value theory herein expounded.

Pepper states correctly (p. 112) that Santayana derives moral standards from the organization or integration of interests.⁵ But Pepper incorrectly interprets this to mean that all the interests of the whole universe must be integrated in order to get a standard. Santayana's meaning is that all the interests of one soul must be integrated in order to get a standard. Only those interests of others need be considered which are the objects of interests of that soul. Pepper insists rightly that all of the interests in the universe cannot be organized into a harmonious whole such as would give one standard. Actually the morality of any interest does not necessarily depend upon its relation to the interests of other people, and never depends directly upon its relation to any of these. There is an ultimate selfishness in every animal life which Pepper recognizes

3—R. B. Perry (op. cit., p. 129-130) repudiates this principle, and repudiates Hobbes whom he accuses of expounding it, tho Perry's basic theory of value seems to me to be anything but repugnant either to this principle or to much of the philosophy of Hobbes. Incidentally it should be noted that while Hobbes ought to have asserted this principle, he does not do so. Perry is wrong in imputing it to him, and both Perry and Hobbes are wrong in not asserting it.

4—Pepper, S. C., *The Equivocation of Value*. U. of Cal. Pub., Philos., Vol. 4, p. 107-132. Berkeley, 1923.

5—Reason in Science, p. 249, 261.

(p. 117), and which, as he sees, Santayana recognizes (Reason in Science, p. 246, 248, 258, 260, 261). This prevents any man from admitting the justice of the defeat of his own ultimate interests in order to help out any universe-wide integration in which he happened not to be interested. Any scheme of things whatever which violates a man's ultimate interests is bad for him. And it is right for him to try to alter it. His effort is right from his own point of view. It is morally right. If a universe-wide system of interests had legitimate authority over the individual's conscience then a so-called ethical or universalistic hedonism, such as Pepper (p. 113) incorrectly imputes to Santayana, would be true.

But universalistic hedonism is a hopeless attempt to beautify the original Epicurean doctrine. The ancient doctrine of egoistic hedonism looks a bit gross as traditionally stated. No doubt it needs to be polished up a little. But adopting the 'ethical' brand of hedonism is not the right way to do it. For this repudiates the essential Epicurean insight. It gives up the human perspective. It gives the happiness of others a claim on our interests irrespective of the natural bent of our interests, and this the happiness of others does not have. Nothing has it. We need not love anything which we do not naturally love, unless as a means to something else which we do love. There is no moral *a priori* such as Rashdall mentions. The happiness of others is good to us (if at all) because we like it, and for no other reason. The way to rehabilitate and embellish hedonism so that it can function gracefully in polite society is, not to change it from its egoistic to its universalistic form, but rather to show that the pleasure in the case is at the opposite end of the interest from that at which it is commonly supposed to be located. The intent-feeling at the source of interest is what determines directly all value, and all good and bad, right and wrong, duty and obligation. It is a man's own feelings which decide what values are for him. These feelings are all located in his self. In judging by them and in only pursuing things toward which they are directed, and in never pursuing anything merely because someone else likes it, he is being wholly selfish in a Pickwickian sense of the word selfishness. Metaphorically speaking, all a man's voluntary acts are the pursuit of his own pleasure. They are what he wills. They are aimed at what he wants. To say that all voluntary acts are the pursuit of a man's own pleasure is a tautology, and therefore must be true. And it is, further, significant, as all tautologies are significant, in that it asserts that two expressions are synonymous. It asserts that the phrase 'a voluntary act' and the phrase 'a pursuit of pleasure' are synonymous. And this assertion is no tautology, tho it is quite true. The attempt to establish universalistic hedonism is like perfuming the pig sty to alleviate the pangs of a few weak stomachs. If anyone cannot reconcile himself to the essential Pickwickian selfishness of never wishing for anything which it is not his own self that wishes, he should immediately forsake the modern interest-theories of value.

It seems to me that Santayana is fairly clear in saying that he does not mean anything like universalistic hedonism. He says, "Any task imposed externally on a man is imposed by force only, a force he has the right to defy so soon as he can do so without creating some greater impediment to his natural vocation" (Reason in Science, p. 248). And again he says that the decision of a moral-

ist as to what those things are in which pleasure ought to be found (i. e., as to which things a man ought to want) will, if the moralist is rational, "express his own nature—on which alone honest ideals can rest—without attempting to speak for the deafening and inconsistent convocation of the whole sentient universe. Duty is a matter of self-knowledge, not of statistics. A living and particular will—cannot for a moment renounce its autonomy without renouncing reason". (p. 258) And again he asserts that my business "is to clarify my own intent". (p. 260) And also "Utilitarianism took up false ground when it made right conduct terminate in miscellaneous pleasures and pains". (p. 260) "The true conscience is rather an integrated natural will, chastened by a clear knowledge of what it pursues and may attain". (p. 261)

Santayana is surely not proposing any universalistic hedonism. Some of his other statements are not perfectly clear, and, taken apart from what I have here set forth, might seem to incline in this direction. But it seems to me undeniable that the truth at which he was driving is the same as that at which I am driving, namely, that it is only in that integration of interests which makes a personality, that valid moral standards and obligations and duties are set up. The interests resident in other souls cannot figure at all in this integration. They are wholly irrelevant in this connection. But every interest, whose source is this soul, is relevant. Any or all of these may establish ends, the means to which become matters of duty for that person. The strongest interests make certain ends the most valuable of all, and the means to these are a man's paramount duties. Pepper (p. 112, 113) misinterprets Santayana's suggestions about a rational mind's taking into consideration all relevant interests when it acts, to mean that all the past, present, and future interests in the universe are relevant and have a right to be present in that integration in which the moral standard is generated. But such is not the case, and such is not what Santayana means. The only interests of other people that are at all relevant to the moral standards and conduct of a man are such interests as he takes an interest in. Many a flourishing interest, dwelling in another soul, is irrelevant to a man's duty, because he has no interest in it. But no interest which flourishes in his own soul is wholly irrelevant to his duty.

And while other people's interests may be relevant, they are so only indirectly and as objects of his interests. If he has an interest in the success of the interests of one whom he loves, then the success of those interests bears upon his duties. But it bears upon them differently from the way in which the interests whose source is the man's own soul, bear upon them. It is a major interest in the man's own soul which constitutes the happiness of the loved one an end, and thus which makes the various means to that happiness a matter of duty for him. The happiness and success of the other person can generate no duties for him in the absence of his interest in these. But given his interest, these are ends the means to which it is his duty to produce. These interests of the other are relevant to his moral life. They are the ends, or some of the ends, in relation to which his duties exist. But surely this is a different kind of relevance from that which the interests, whose source is his own soul, have to his duties. The interests in his own soul (some of them) are what constitute the success of these other interests the

ends which they are. This is rather a fundamental difference. And Santayana is not as clear as he should be about it. It is indeed difficult to be clear about it.

Duty and moral obligation are firmly based on human interest. Social duties are genuine and binding and largely mutual because we are interested in our fellows and because they are interested in us. Each soul is isolated from direct contacts with any other. But the indirect contacts are many and various. Moral obligation for a man depends only upon his own interest. But the deeper interests of most men are very similar. And the deeper interests of one man are generally capable of enactment pretty much harmoniously with those of others. Brotherly love is the best rule except on certain occasions when cooperation is impossible. Men and mosquitoes are so very differently constituted and so naturally opposed to one another, that they probably will never cooperate. But men are not constituted by nature so diametrically opposed to each other as this. When they fall out with each other it is often due to a misunderstanding. And seldom do their quarrels involve an utter antagonism; human enemies usually have something in common, and find themselves actually cooperating for certain ends. In the late unpleasantness (1914-1918) both of these principles were exhibited. All of the governments kept the support of the people as long as they did only because the people believed the official propaganda. And tho there was much slaughter, prisoners were not put to death, and the victors did not, in their hour of triumph, kill off the male population among the vanquished, nor enslave the women and children. It was to the interest of the Allies not to destroy their enemies completely. In economic competition and in the division of the loot gained in any business among those who have helped to secure it, there are genuine conflicts which, unlike most international conflicts, are not due to any misunderstandings. All the parties are generally pretty clear eyed about the actual state of things. But here the conflict is limited to only a small part of the personalities of the parties, except occasionally in open industrial warfare. Unless there is a violent strike or a racketeer's war going on, men in one community, whose economic interests conflict, are also actively cooperating as citizens. I do not think that conflicts between men can ever be wholly eliminated. But they need not be deadly, and they need not involve the whole of the conflicting personalities. Thus while I think that it will always be true (while there are as many as two living things on earth) that some things which are genuinely and ultimately good for one will be similarly bad for another, I do not think that this is necessarily an intolerable situation. It should not cause serious grief to any soul which loves his fellow man. The human animal normally can stand a certain amount of fighting and a certain amount of defeat, and still be happy enough to call life on the whole worth living. Most people enjoy a certain amount of fighting, and would rather have it, at the risk of some defeat, than avoid both occasional defeat and all fighting.

Moral principles will never be utterly universal. And if they ever were they would still not be absolute. They would be even then, as now, relative to the interests which generate them. Their essential obligatory nature is not taken away from them by their dependence upon interest. Rather it is interest alone which has ever given them, and can ever give them, their obligatory nature.

